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	 ABSTRACT	Despite	initially	denying	Kim	IL	Sung’s	requests	for	a	military	reunification	in	1949,	Josef	Stalin	decided	to	support	an	invasion	of	South	Korea	in	1950.	This	paper	explores	the	origins	of	the	Korean	War	and	the	roles	of	both	the	Soviet	Civil	Administration	and	Kim	IL	Sung	in	convincing	Stalin	that	the	invasion	was	necessary,	and	that	it	would	be	neither	prolonged,	nor	involve	American	interference.	Throughout	the	initial	occupation	of	North	Korea,	Stalin	preferred	to	maintain	the	status	quo	on	the	peninsula,	as	he	was	open	to,	but	deeply	suspicious	of	plans	for	reunification	and	restrained	Kim’s	ambitions.		However,	both	the	SCA	and	Kim	manipulated	Stalin	and	played	off	both	his	fears	of	a	southern	led	invasion,	and	potentially	losing	a	communist	ally	to	China.	By	1949	Stalin	had	already	been	convinced	by	them	of	the	necessity	for	a	military	reunification	and	cautiously	approved	Kim’s	plans.				 		
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INTRODUCTION	The	relationship	between	the	Democratic	Peoples	Republic	of	Korea	(DPRK)	and	the	Union	of	Soviet	Socialist	Republics	(USSR)	during	the	Korean	War	has	seen	both	a	reinvigorated	resonance	due	to	the	on-going	release	of	archival	documents,	as	well	as	a	fresh	immediacy	due	to	renewed	tensions	on	the	peninsula	and	Russia’s	attempts	to	restore	and	strengthen	relations	with	North	Korea.	Of	all	the	actors	in	Korea’s	political	history	however,	the	Soviet	Union	has	received	the	least	attention	by	Western	historians,	who	have	tended	to	concentrate	on	the	American,	Chinese	and	Korean	roles	on	the	peninsula.	Moreover,	while	the	early	period	of	Korea’s	division	has	been	covered	extensively,	comparatively	few	studies	have	focused	on	Soviet	policy	in	the	region,	and	until	recently	have	relied	on	scant	Soviet	sources.	This	lack	of	primary	sources	caused	historians	to	make	conclusions	that	were	generally	inferred	by	the	rhetoric	of	Soviet	policy,	and	as	a	result,	reached	drastically	varying	interpretations.	With	the	declassification	of	archival	documents	from	the	former	Soviet	Union,	beginning	in	the	early	1990’s,	historians	have	been	given	a	unique	opportunity	to	reassess	many	of	the	events	surrounding	the	division	of	Korea	and	the	Korean	war	by	integrating	new	materials,	evidence	and	perspectives	into	a	narrative	that	had	previously	been	dominated	by	American	sources.		
Archival	documents	now	show	that	prior	to	1949,	Josef	Stalin	preferred	to	maintain	the	status	quo	on	the	Korean	peninsula,	as	he	was	deeply	suspicious	of	Kim	IL	Sung’s	plans	for	reunification	and	sought	to	restrain	his	ambitions.	During	1949	however,	both	the	Soviet	Civil	Administration	(the	occupying	government	of	North	
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Korea	established	by	the	USSR)	and	Kim	IL	Sung	began	to	manipulate	Stalin	through	reports	of	growing	clashes	at	the	border	as	well	as	Kim’s	“policy	of	balancing”	which	played	off	of	Stalin’s	fears	of	China’s	increasing	role	in	the	communist	movement	in	Asia.	With	Stalin	convinced	that	military	reunification	was	inevitable	and	that	the	eventual	conflict	would	be	neither	prolonged,	nor	involve	American	interference,	Soviet	policy	began	to	gradually	shift	towards	cautious	expansionism	in	early	1949.	This	narrative	is	a	significant	departure	from	the	historiography	prior	to	the	opening	of	the	archives	as	it	shows	that	Kim	had	more	agency	in	the	conflict	than	previously	argued.	While	North	Korea	was	highly	dependent	on	the	USSR,	Stalin	did	not	have	pervasive	control	over	him.	Ultimately	Stalin	relied	on	Kim	and	the	Soviet	Civil	Administration	(SCA)	for	information	on	the	peninsula,	and	they	consequently	played	an	extensive	role	in	informing	Soviet	policy	regarding	a	military	invasion.	The	origins	of	the	Korean	War	therefore	illustrate	the	balance	of	power	held	by	the	Soviet	Union	and	North	Korea,	and	show	that	the	conflict	was	a	civil	war	with	both	strong	indigenous	and	international	elements.	Kim	Il	Sung,	a	politician	with	large	ambitions,	enticed	the	Soviet	Union	to	become	heavily	involved	and	help	him	attempt	to	gain	control	over	the	Korean	peninsula.	Stalin	meanwhile	used	the	peninsula	as	a	battleground	to	advance	his	own	foreign	policy	goals	and	prestige	within	the	communist	movement.		
METHODOLOGY	AND	SOURCES	This	paper	will	rely	on	recently	declassified	primary	documents	from	the	period	1945	-	1950,	the	majority	of	which	have	come	from	Russian	archives.	The	documents	have	been	obtained	from	the	Cold	War	International	History	Project	
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Digital	Archive,	an	initiative	established	by	the	Woodrow	Wilson	Center	for	Scholars,	which	has	also	translated	many	of	the	sources	into	English.	While	the	scope	of	inquiry	has	been	significantly	increased	for	historians	of	Soviet-North	Korean	relations,	they	are	still	hampered	by	the	fact	that	many	more,	potentially	significant,	documents	have	yet	to	be	released.	Furthermore,	while	some	North	Korean	sources	have	been	made	available	to	Western	scholars,	most	notably	the	captured	documents	at	the	National	Archives	in	Washington	DC,	they	are	generally	limited	to	government	decisions	at	the	provincial	levels	and	below,	offering	little	insight	into	Kim	IL	Sung’s	decision	making	and	relationship	with	Stalin.	Therefore,	one	of	the	main,	and	most	obvious,	methodological	challenges	of	this	paper	is	the	limitation	of	available	documents.	However,	the	material	that	has	been	made	available	is	incredibly	revealing	and	has	contributed	to	the	wider	use	of	Soviet	sources	in	the	historiography.	These	documents	include	records	of	Politburo	meetings	and	decisions,	official	orders,	as	well	as	telegrams,	cables	and	communications	between	Stalin,	Kim	IL	Sung	and	high-ranking	officials	from	the	USSR	and	North	Korea.		
It	should	also	be	noted	that	while	many	of	the	revelations	made	since	the	partial	opening	of	the	Russia	archives	are	not	new,	they	provide	further	evidence	to	arguments	already	deduced	from	other	sources.	As	historian	Andreas	Oberender	emphasizes,	it	is	unlikely	that	any	new	sources	from	the	archives	will	significantly	alter	our	understanding	of	Stalin’s	approach	to	foreign	policy	or	his	relationships	
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with	communist	leaders	such	as	Kim	IL	Sung.	1	Czech	historian	Voitech	Mastny	makes	a	similar	assertion,	remarking	that	the	“greatest	surprise	so	far	to	have	come	from	the	Russian	archives	is	that	there	was	no	surprise”,	arguing	that	the	perspectives	from	the	sources	seem	to	conform	to	what	was	publicly	stated	by	the	Soviet	government.2	However,	though	the	archival	documents	may	not	contain	any	dramatic	surprises	or	“smoking	guns”,	their	value	goes	beyond	confirmations	of	arguments	already	made	by	historians.		These	documents	offer	rare	insight	into	Soviet	foreign	affairs.	As	an	example,	Bulgarian	historian	Radoslav	Yordanov	points	to	the	theory	of	layered	policy	revealed	in	the	Russian	archives.3	This	idea,	first	introduced	by	Jack	Matlock,	US	Deputy	Chief	of	Mission	in	Moscow,	argues	that	there	was	layered	bookkeeping	in	Soviet	decision-making,	which	included	policy	aimed	at	public	consumption,	another	aimed	at	the	United	States	and	finally	the	real	policy,	which	was	reflected	in	Soviet	actions	and	covert	operations.4	This	layered	policy	is	especially	evident	in	the	archival	documents	on	Stalin’s	foreign	policy	in	North	Korea,	specifically	in	documents	aimed	at	alleviating	concerns	of	communist	allies	abroad.	Though	this	presents	another	methodological	problem	for	historians,	since	it	is	not	always	apparent	when	documents	reflect	actual	calculations	or	simply	propaganda	meant	to	mask	real	intentions,	it	is	beneficial	in	providing	insight	into	Stalin’s	perception	of	the	USSR’s	role	in	Korea,	how	he	wanted	to	portray	it	to	the	
																																								 																				
1	Andreas	Oberender,	"Stalins	Postwar	Foreign	Policy,"	Kritika:	Explorations	in	Russian	and	
Eurasian	History	13,	no.	4	(Fall	2012):	940	2	Voitech	Mastny,	The	Cold	War	and	Soviet	Insecurity:	The	Stalin	Years	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1996),	9		
3	Radoslav	A.	Yordanov,	The	Soviet	Union	and	the	Horn	of	Africa	during	the	Cold	War:	Between	Ideology	and	Pragmatism	(Lanham:	Lexington	Books,	2016),	15.	4	Peter	Ruggenthaler,	The	Concept	of	Neutrality	in	Stalins	Foreign	Policy,	1945-1953	(Lanham:	Lexington	Books,	2015),	45.	
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rest	of	the	world,	and	offers	clues	into	Soviet	decision	making.	Therefore,	while	the	available	documents	do	not	contain	answers	to	every	question	surrounding	the	origins	of	the	war,	they	illustrate	a	clearer	picture	of	Soviet	involvement	in	North	Korean	nation	building,	the	relationship	between	the	two	nations,	as	well	as	a	glimpse	into	the	motivations	behind	the	actions	of	both	Stalin	and	Kim	IL	Sung.	These	perspectives	have	been	previously	non-existent.	Therefore,	this	paper	will	apply	these	new	sources	to	the	historiographical	debate	to	help	add	nuance	to	it.	This	topic	has	only	been	given	cursory	attention	until	recently	but	contains	valuable	parallels	and	insights	into	Russian	and	North	Korean	foreign	policy	today.	It	also	acknowledges	the	fact	that	many	of	these	debates	cannot	be	fully	put	to	rest	until	the	further	release	of	documents	from	Russian	and	North	Korean	archives.		
HISTORIOGRAPHY	As	many	scholars	have	noted,	much	remains	obscure	regarding	the	origins	and	root	causes	of	the	Korean	War.	Two	of	the	most	fundamental	questions	pertaining	to	the	relations	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	DPRK	ask	what	kind	of	role	the	Soviet	Union	played	in	the	planning	of	the	invasion	before	June	25,	1950	and	what	were	Stalin’s	motives?	The	second	asks	to	what	extent	should	the	conflict	be	classified	as	a	civil	or	international	war?	These	two	questions	are	of	course	interrelated	and	are	at	the	core	of	the	historiographical	debate.		
The	historiography	of	the	Soviet	Union’s	involvement	in	the	origins	of	the	Korean	War	has	been	plagued	with,	until	recently,	a	lack	of	primary	sources	from	communist	countries,	which	has	resulted	in	incomplete	and	widely	varying	assessments	of	its	role.	Furthermore,	it	has	also	facilitated	the	excessively	large	role	
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ideology	has	played	in	informing	these	narratives.5	This	role	of	ideology	generally	divided	historians	into	three	distinct	categories.	The	orthodox	school	consists	of	historians	who	argued	that	the	Soviet	Union’s	foreign	policy	was	aggressive	and	expansionist	and	therefore	responsible	for	the	conflicts	of	the	Cold	War.	The	second,	revisionist	school,	placed	emphasis	on	the	role	of	America’s	aggressive	foreign	policy.	The	third	school,	identified	as	post-revisionist,	arose	after	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	and	introduced	a	more	balanced	approach	to	the	narrative.	This	last	school	depicted	Soviet	Foreign	policy	as	pragmatic	but	opportunistic,	while	also	asserting	the	existence	of	an	American	empire.		
Although	these	schools	encompass	a	broad	range	of	arguments	within	themselves,	they	become	a	useful	framework	when	merged	with	the	various	theories	of	Stalin’s	foreign	policy	and	Soviet	international	behavior.	Among	these	theories	of	Soviet	foreign	policy,	Western	historians	have	generally	been	divided	into	three	major	perspectives,	and	when	applied	to	Korea,	they	can	be	defined	as	“hegemonic	expansionism”,	“communist	fortification”	and	“cautious	expansionism”.	These	theories	focus	on	the	role	of	ideology	in	Stalin’s	foreign	policy	and	along	with	claims	about	Stalin’s	motives,	are	at	the	core	of	the	competing	models.	The	merging	of	these	elements	reveals	a	dynamic	historiographical	discussion.		
The	theory	of	hegemonic	expansionism	characterizes	the	Soviet	Union	as	a	power	that	sought	world	hegemony	and	was	therefore	incompatible	with	the	international	community,	especially	with	the	United	States.	Daniel	Yergin,	an	
																																								 																				
5	Chull-Baum	Kim.	The	Truth	about	the	Korean	War:	Testimony	40	Years	Later	(Seoul:	Eulyoo,	1992),	187.	
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eminent	historian	of	Soviet	foreign	policy,	has	described	this	view	as	the	“Riga	Axiom”,	which	experts	in	the	United	States	government	generally	operated	under	during	the	Cold	War.6	This	perspective	is	uncompromising,	illustrating	the	Soviet	Union	as	a	permanent	adversary	to	the	US	and	informed	historical	narratives	by	highlighting	communist	strengths	and	capabilities	instead	of	weaknesses.		A	main	tenant	of	this	model	is	the	idea	that	Stalin’s	primary	motivation	for	supporting	communist	revolutions	abroad	was	to	secure	his	role	as	the	leader	of	communism	and	acquire	global	power.		Furthermore	it	imagined	communist	ideology	as	playing	the	most	important	role	in	informing	Soviet	behavior.	7	
This	model	heavily	informs	the	Orthodox	school	of	thought	which	arose	immediately	during	and	after	the	events	of	the	Korean	War.	It	is	important	to	note	however	that	due	to	a	lack	of	primary	sources,	Orthodox	historians’	explanations	of	Soviet	behavior	vary	dramatically,	with	many	even	completely	ignoring	the	USSR	in	their	accounts,	or	otherwise	relegating	it	to	the	background	and	instead	placing	emphasis	on	China’s	role	in	the	conflict.	However,	the	majority	agreed	that	the	invasion	of	South	Korea	was	part	of	Stalin’s	grand	plans.	The	school	did	little	to	establish	a	well-defined	relationship	between	Stalin	and	Kim,	as	Stalin	was	not	only	seen	as	the	architect	of	the	war,	but	as	the	puppet	master	of	both	Kim	and	North	Korea.		It	depicts	Stalin	as	motivated	by	the	desire	to	use	North	Korea	as	a	springboard	to	communize	the	rest	of	Asia,	and	that	they	essentially	made	all	the	
																																								 																				
6	Erik	Van.	Ree,	Socialism	in	One	Zone:	Stalins	Policy	in	Korea,	1945-1947	(Oxford:	Berg,	1989),	9.	
7Adam	B.	Ulam,	"Soviet	Ideology	and	Soviet	Foreign	Policy,"	in	The	Conduct	of	Soviet	Foreign	
Policy,	ed.	Erik	Peter	Hoffmann	(New	York,	NY:	Routledge,	1981),	136.	
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basic	political	decisions	in	North	Korea.8	Therefore,	it	views	the	war	as	international	in	origin,	with	the	United	States	reacting	to	the	dominance	of	the	Soviet	Union	in	the	peninsula.	Although	many	of	the	orthodox	school’s	arguments	have	become	either	outdated,	or	largely	irrelevant,	many	have	continued	to	inform	more	recent	debate.	Historian	Robert	Slusser	for	example,	recently	argued	that	Stalin	concealed	a	plan	to	occupy	the	entire	Korean	peninsula	for	himself,	purposely	keeping	his	allies	in	the	dark	about	his	intentions.9	
The	“Communist	fortification”	theory	characterizes	Soviet	foreign	policy	as	more	pragmatic	and	inherently	defensive	in	nature.	In	this	model,	the	Soviet	Union’s	foreign	policy	was	wholly	motivated	by	security	concerns	and	was	seen	to	behave	as	a	traditional	power	within	the	international	system,	not	one	that	wanted	to	overthrow	it.	In	cases	where	it	supported	communist	revolutions,	as	in	Korea,	its	main,	if	not	only	concern,	was	the	security	of	the	USSR.	Therefore,	according	to	the	theory,	its	primary	interest	in	maintaining	a	friendly	regime	in	North	Korea	was	for	it	to	act	as	a	security	buffer.	This	model	therefore	did	not	see	it	necessary	for	the	Soviet	Union	to	become	deeply	involved	in	nation	building	in	Korea	or	in	planning	an	invasion	of	South	Korea.	
This	model	informed	the	Revisionist	school	which	arose	around	the	late	1960’s,	a	general	period	of	mistrust	in	American	foreign	policy,	and	reached	its	peak	
																																								 																				8	Robert	A.	Scalapino	and	Chong-Sik	Lee,	North	Korea:	Building	of	the	Monolithic	State	(Berwyn,	PA:	KHU	Press,	2017);	17	
9	Robert	Slusser,	“Soviet	Far	Eastern	Policy,	1945-1950:	Stalin’s	Goals	in	Korea,”	in	Yonosuke	Nagai	and	Akira	Iriye,	eds.,	The	Origins	of	the	Cold	War	in	Asia	(Tokyo:	University	of	Tokyo	Press,	1977),	123-46.	
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in	the	1980’s	with	Bruce	Cummings’	two	massive	volumes	on	the	origins	of	the	Korean	War.	Cummings’	theories	expanded	on	earlier	works,	most	notably	I.F	Stone’s	The	Hidden	History	of	the	Korean	War	(1952),	and	Robert	Simmons’	The	
Strained	Alliance	(1975),	which	attempted	to	shift	blame	from	the	Soviet	Union	to	the	United	States	as	well	as	highlight	the	civil	nature	of	the	conflict.10	Cummings’	arguments	detracted	significantly	from	the	Orthodox	school	and	were	largely	an	indictment	of	American	involvement	in	the	Korean	War.	In	his	assessments,	Cummings	highlighted	Korean	agency	by	arguing	that	the	conflict	largely	arose	from	local	conflicts	among	political	groups	in	Korea.	Cummings	and	other	Revisionists	highly	exaggerated	the	internal	factors	of	the	war,	although	their	arguments	were	integral	to	the	debate	as	they	made	substantial	contributions	to	the	historiography	by	demonstrating	a	significant	amount	of	North	Korean	agency	in	the	invasion.	11	
While	the	school	contributed	to	a	broader	understanding	of	the	bilateral	responsibilities	for	the	conflicts	in	the	Cold	War,	like	the	Orthodox	school,	it	did	not	have	the	benefit	of	Soviet	archival	materials.	Without	these	sources	many	of	its	conclusions	relied	on	scant	evidence	and	generally	regarded	Stalin’s	actions	as	reactionary	to	U.S	policies,	thus	placing	emphasis	and	blame	on	the	United	States.	The	school	also	generally	overemphasized	the	indigenous	elements	of	the	revolution	and	failed	to	link	them	to	international	factors.	Instead,	its	historians	downgraded	the	Soviet	Union’s	role	to	that	of	a	pragmatic	and	unwilling	partner	or	even	one	that	
																																								 																				10	Robert	R.	Simmons,	The	Strained	Alliance:	Peking,	Pyŏngyang,	Moscow	and	the	Politics	of	
the	Korean	Civil	War.	(New	York:	Free	Press,	1975),	7	11	William		Stueck..	Rethinking	the	Korean	War	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2013);	28	
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was	minimally	involved,	such	as	David	Rees	who	argued	that	all	available	evidence	suggested	that	Moscow	didn’t	expect	an	attack.12		
The	period	of	détente	significantly	changed	the	historiography	after	the	transcripts	of	tapes	recorded	by	Nikita	Khrushchev	were	published	in	a	memoir	in	1970.	The	memoir	recollected	several	decades	of	Soviet	history	and	provided	a	rare	inside	look	into	personal	conversations	with	Stalin	and	secret	politburo	meetings	on	the	Korean	War.	The	revelations	within	it	led	to	a	major	reassessment	of	the	Soviet	Union’s	role	in	Korea	and	dealt	severe	blows	to	both	Orthodox	and	Revisionist	accounts.	In	the	tapes,	Khrushchev	recounted	the	origins	of	the	Korean	War	stating,	
For	many	years	we	insisted	that	the	initiative	for	starting	the	Korean	War	came	from	South	Korea.	Some	say	there	is	no	need	to	correct	this	version	of	events,	because	it	would	be	of	advantage	only	to	our	enemies.	I’m	telling	the	truth	now	for	the	sake	of	history:	it	was	the	initiative	of	Comrade	Kim	Il	Sung,	and	it	was	supported	by	Stalin…It	was	not	Stalin’s	initiative	but	he	supported	Kim	Il	Sung.	Although	I	blame	Stalin	for	all	the	crimes	he	committed,	on	this	I	am	with	him.13	Khrushchev’s	recollection	was	a	significant	departure	from	revisionist	accounts	as	well	as	the	official	Soviet	line,	which	emphasized	that	the	USSR	had	no	knowledge	of	the	invasion	and	that	the	ROK	had	instigated	the	conflict.	Significantly	though,	while	Khrushchev	admitted	the	Soviet	Union’s	role	in	the	conflict,	he	placed	primary	responsibility	with	Kim	IL	Sung	and	the	North	Koreans,	and	moreover	claimed	that	Stalin	tried	to	limit	Soviet	involvement.		For	the	orthodox	school,	it	shifted	the	
																																								 																				12	David	Rees.	Korea,	The	Limited	War.	(Dehra	Dun:	Natraj	Publishers,	1985),	32	
13	Khruschev,	Nikita	Sergreevich.	Khruschev	Remembers.	Boston:	Little,	Brown,	1970.	144-145	
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central	figure	from	Stalin	to	Kim	and	for	revisionists	it	showed	evidence	of	Soviet	participation	and	knowledge	of	the	invasion.		
Khrushchev’s	tapes	contain	inherent	biases	and	issues,	and	are	further	hampered	by	the	fact	that	Stalin,	especially	in	his	last	years,	was	highly	skeptical	and	mistrusted	even	his	close	associates;	therefore	it	is	unlikely	that	he	would	have	divulged	his	intentions	to	his	politburo	entirely.	However,	the	passages	on	North	Korea	are	incredibly	insightful	as	they	are	the	only	instance	where	Khrushchev,	going	against	the	entire	anti-Stalinist	tone	of	the	memoir,	decided	to	defend	Stalin’s	actions.	Had	Khrushchev	been	motivated	simply	by	protecting	the	image	of	the	Soviet	Union	while	denouncing	Stalin,	he	would	have	been	far	more	likely	to	have	taken	up	the	Orthodox	account	while	placing	responsibility	with	the	Soviet	leader.	Nevertheless,	for	the	first	time	the	memoirs	provided	Western	historians	with	an	opportunity	to	incorporate	a	Soviet	source	into	their	narratives	and	highlighted	the	need	to	incorporate	archival	evidence	from	the	USSR.		
The	second	shift	occurred	after	the	opening	of	the	Soviet	archives	following	the	collapse	of	the	USSR	in	1991,	which	provided	Western	historians	with	a	wealth	of	formerly	classified	documents	on	Soviet	decision	making	in	foreign	affairs.	This	broadened	access	facilitated	a	shift	in	the	historiography	of	the	Korean	War	by	allowing	historians	to	come	to	consensuses	on	many	debates	and	investigate	the	nuances	of	the	relationships	between	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	DPRK.	It	also	saw	the	emergence	of	the	Post-Revisionist	school,	which	in	many	ways	began	to	synthesize	the	findings	of	both	the	Orthodox,	and	Revisionist	schools.	It	effectively	dismissed	
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many	of	the	arguments	of	both	schools,	providing	firm	evidence	of	the	far-reaching	Soviet	involvement	on	the	peninsula,	while	also	showing	the	cautiousness	of	Stalin’s	policies	and	Kim’s	independence	from	him.		
This	revelation	of	Stalin’s	cautious	approach	promoted	the	theory	of	Cautious	Expansionism,	which	was	first	proposed	by	Russian	historian	Vladislav	Zubok	and	later	expanded	upon	by	Erik	Van	Ree.	The	model	is	essentially	characterized	by	a	more	complex	duality	of	expansion	and	fortification.	It	understands	that	Stalin	had	multiple	considerations	and	motives	in	his	foreign	policy	and	while	there	is	a	lot	of	debate,	many	historians	agree	that	security	issues	were	among	the	most	significant.	The	model	asserts	that	Stalin	was	at	times	ready	to	concede	to	the	United	States	and	the	international	community	as	his	aspirations	were	generally	limited,	and	he	was	skeptical	of	communist	revolutions	and	allies	abroad.	Furthermore,	unlike	the	Communist	Expansionism	model	which	argued	ideology	fuelled	and	informed	policy,	the	Cautious	Expansionism	model	admitted	that	ideological	beliefs	may	have	“legitimized,	but	did	not	determine,	the	Kremlin’s	foreign	policy.”14	
This	model	is	used	by	the	Post-Revisionist	school,	which	presents	a	realpolitik	approach	to	Soviet	foreign	policy	and	which	tends	treat	the	Korean	War	in	the	wider	context	of	decolonization	in	Asia	after	the	Second	World	War.	It	asserts	that	the	Soviet	Union	primarily	saw	Korea	as	just	another	Japanese	property,	which	could	be	exploited	and	looted,	but	stresses	that	it	did	not	have	any	grand	
																																								 																				
14	Zubok,	Vladislav.	"Stalins	Plans	and	Russian	Archives."	Diplomatic	History	21,	no.	1	(April	1997):	302	
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operational	plans.	15	The	main	historians	within	this	school	include	Katheryn	Weathersby,	Richard	Thorton,	Andrei	Lankov	and	Charles	Armstrong.	However	their	interpretations	of	primary	documents	vary	greatly	and	there	is	little	consensus	on	important	questions	such	as	whether	Kim	was	truly	a	puppet	of	Stalin,	whether	Stalin	directly	micromanaged	policies	in	Korea,	or	if	he	gave	Terentii	Shtykov,	head	of	the	SCA,	free	reign,	and	what	motives	he	had	in	approving	the	invasion	of	South	Korea.	
The	synthesis	of	revisionist	and	orthodox	schools	has	also	allowed	for	more	nuanced	approaches	to	Stalin’s	policies	as	well	as	his	relationship	to	Kim	which	are	discussed	in	more	depth	in	the	following	chapter.	The	post-revisionist	school	is	also	characterized	by	its	understanding	that	due	to	the	nature	of	foreign	policy	it	is	impossible	to	assign	a	concrete	definition	to	Stalin’s	policies	as	they	were	fluid	and	changed	according	to	different	geopolitical	considerations.	Finally,	the	school	has	a	tendency	to	recognize	the	conflict	as	an	internationalized	civil	war	and	therefore	distinctions	between	its	international	and	civil	natures	have	become	largely	irrelevant.	As	Allan	R.	Millet	succinctly	states,	“[modern]	civil	wars	are	seldom,	if	ever,	fought	in	an	international	vacuum.”16	Therefore,	as	the	school	agrees,	it	is	impossible	to	isolate	international	and	domestic	factors	from	one	another,	as	civil	wars	tend	to	have	internal	and	international	dynamics	as	well	as	a	shifting	set	of	political	actors	who	all	have	distinct	agendas.17		
																																								 																				15	Millet,	“The	Korean	War”	191	16	Millett,	Allan	R.	"The	Korean	War:	A	50-Year	Critical	Historiography."	The	Journal	of	Strategic	Studies	24,	no.	1	(March	2001):	193	17	Millet,	“The	Korean	War,”	190	
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STALIN’S	POST-WAR	FOREIGN	POLICY	AND	THE	JOINT	TRUSTEESHIP	ISSUE	
(1945)	In	the	late	1920’s	Stalin	had	adopted	his	theory	of	“Socialism	in	One	Country”	into	Soviet	policy,	focusing	primarily	on	asserting	and	expanding	his	influence	within	the	USSR.	By	the	last	years	of	the	Second	World	War,	changes	in	the	Soviet	Union’s	position	on	the	world	stage	facilitated	a	renewed	interest	for	him	in	the	revolution	abroad,	though	this	was	at	first	focused	mainly	in	Europe.18	However,	due	to	a	multitude	of	factors	including	the	United	States’	position	in	Japan	and	the	Chinese	communist	revolution,	Stalin’s	attention	gradually	turned	to	the	Far	East.	While	Stalin	had	some	expansionist	goals	in	Korea,	such	as	the	establishment	of	a	warm	seaport,	he	followed	a	policy	of	cautious	and	limited	expansion	as	he	was	primarily	concentrated	on	socialism	within	the	USSR	and	relegated	the	world	revolution	to	the	background.19	This	policy	was	largely	influenced	by	a	suspicion	of	communist	revolutions	and	leaders	abroad,	and	helps	explain	Stalin’s	occasional	cooperation	with	the	United	States	such	as	his	decisions	on	the	issue	of	a	joint	trusteeship	in	Korea.	
Stalin’s	decisions	to	occasionally	cooperate	with	the	West	are	one	of	the	key	arguments	made	by	historians	who	subscribe	to	the	cautious	expansionist	model	of	Soviet	foreign	policy.	For	example,	in	his	analysis	Eric	Van	Ree	points	to	the	Soviet	withdrawal	in	Manchuria	and	Northern	Iran	as	evidence	of	Stalin’s	modest	global	
																																								 																				
18 Samuel	Wells.	Jr,	“Stalin’s	Decisions	for	War	in	Korea”	(presentation,	Woodrow	Wilson	Conference,	Washington,	D.C,	June	6,	2013.)	19	Samuel	Wells.	Jr,	“Stalin’s	Decisions	for	War	in	Korea”	June	6,	2013.	
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aspirations.20	These	limited	aspirations	also	emerge	from	archival	documents	which	show	that	Stalin’s	efforts	to	expand	the	Soviet	Union’s	zone	of	direct	military	influence	were	“rare	and	rather	easily	checked.”21	His	tendency	to	acquiesce	to	the	demands	of	the	United	States	are	illustrated	when,	by	the	end	of	1945	at	the	Moscow	Conference,	Stalin	agreed	to	a	joint	trusteeship	on	the	Korean	Peninsula.	During	the	conference,	the	governments	of	the	United	States	and	the	USSR,	along	with	China	and	the	UK	pledged	to	commit	to	an	“agreement	concerning	a	four-power	trusteeship	of	Korea	for	a	period	of	up	to	five	years.”22	Historians	tend	to	have	difficulties	in	explaining	Stalin’s	decision	to	agree	to	the	trusteeship.	Orthodox	arguments	contend	that	the	Soviet	Union	was	disingenuous	in	its	affirmation	of	a	trusteeship	and	simply	used	it	as	a	ploy	to	lull	the	United	States	into	a	false	sense	of	security.23	Revisionist	historians	such	as	JongSoo	Lee	are	less	pessimistic	in	their	approach,	suggesting	that	the	Soviet	Union	was	fully	supportive	of	the	trusteeship	for	reasons	that	included	the	fact	that	it	“reminded	them	of	an	old	turn-of-the-century	spheres	of	influence	discussion	between	Imperial	Japan	and	Czarist	Russia	to	divide	up	the	peninsula	themselves	also	at	the	38th	parallel.”24	Archival	evidence	however	points	to	more	pragmatic	policy	decision-making,	which	fit	within	the	trends	illustrated	by	the	cautious	expansionism	model.	Stalin	was	sincere	in	his	
																																								 																				20	Erik	Van.	Ree,	Socialism	in	One	Zone:	Stalins	Policy	in	Korea,	1945-1947	(Oxford:	Berg,	1989)	7.	21	Ree,	“Socialism	in	One	Zone”,	8.	22	Report	of	the	Meeting	of	the	Ministers	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	the	Union	of	Soviet	Socialist	Republics,	the	United	States	of	America,	the	United	Kingdom,	Moscow,	December	16-26,	1945.	Yale	Law	School	Lillian	Goldman	Law	Library	23	Lee,	Jongsoo.	"The	Division	of	Korea	and	the	Rise	of	Two	Koreas,	1945–1948."	In	
Routledge	Handbook	of	Modern	Korean	History,	edited	by	Michael	J.	Seth,	(150	–	193)	Abingdon:	Routledge,	2016;	xvi	24	Jongsoo.	“The	Division	of	Korea	and	the	Rise	of	Two	Koreas”,	173	
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acceptance	of	a	joint	trusteeship,	but	also	hesitant	to	fully	commit	to	it,	as	he	believed	he	could	potentially	gain	more	on	the	peninsula.	This	is	evident	in	Stalin’s	meeting	with	the	former	Premier	of	the	Republic	of	China	T.V.	Soong	on	July	2,	1945,	when	Stalin	made	it	clear	that	while	he	agreed	in	principle	with	the	trusteeship,	he	did	not	agree	unilaterally	with	the	decision	and	had	reservations	regarding	its	potential	for	success.25	As	Van	Ree	argues,	Stalin	was	not	enthusiastic	about	the	trusteeship	as	he	suspected	the	Soviet	Union’s	role	could	potentially	obtain	more	than	one	quarter	of	the	peninsula,	but	“they	did	not	reject	it	out	of	hand	because	they	were	not	prepared	to	accept	an	American	role	in	the	peninsula.”26	Essentially,	the	agreement	was	a	maneuver	to	potentially	avoid	an	aggressive	US	response	had	the	USSR	rejected	the	trusteeship	outright.	The	Soviet	Union	took	on	a	wait-and-see	approach	by	providing	reluctant	affirmation	and	while	it	was	likely	not	looking	to	dominate	the	entire	peninsula,	it	was	also	hesitant	to	accept	a	minority	role.			
REVOLUTION	AND	NATION	BUILDING:	THE	SOVIET	CIVIL	ADMINISTRATION	IN	
NORTH	KOREA	(1945	–	1946)	Near	the	final	stages	of	the	Asia-Pacific	War,	local	Korean	groups	had	begun	preparations	for	a	post-war	transition	and	independence.	By	mid	August	1945,	numerous	Korean	self-government	groups	or	“peoples	committees”	made	up	of	local	activists	and	political	figures	emerged	throughout	the	peninsula	to	fill	the	vacuum	left	by	the	retreating	Japanese	forces.		While	the	American	forces	dismantled	these	
																																								 																				25	“Record	of	a	Meeting	between	T.V.	Soong	and	Stalin,”	July	02,	1945,	History	and	Public	Policy	Program	Digital	Archive,	Victor	Hoo	Collection,	box	6,	folder	9,	Hoover	Institution	Archives.	Contributed	by	David	Wolff.	
26	Erik	Van	Ree,	Socialism	in	One	Zone:	Stalins	Policy	in	Korea,	1945-1947	(Oxford:	Berg,	1989)	51.	
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committees,	the	Soviet	Union	decided	to	use	them	to	their	advantage	by	incorporating	them	into	the	Soviet	Civil	Administration	(SCA).27	Established	in	October	1945,	the	SCA	acted	as	the	occupying	government	of	North	Korea	and	was	ostensibly	created	to	oversee	the	establishment	of	an	independent	Korean	government.	Unfortunately,	its	real	purpose,	as	well	as	its	structure	and	the	balance	of	power	it	held	in	the	initial	occupation	does	not	clearly	emerge	within	the	existing	historiography.	Orthodox	historians	illustrated	the	SCA	as	a	military	government	arguing	that	through	it,	the	Soviet	Union	had	taken	immediate	control	and	established	a	puppet	state	similar	to	those	throughout	Eastern	Europe.	Accounts	such	as	Korean	historian	Dae-Sook	Suh’s	for	example	claim	that	the	Soviet	Union	virtually	dictated	its	wishes	to	the	North	Koreans	through	its	military	government	immediately	after	occupation.28	Interestingly	however,	many	other	traditional	accounts	from	the	period	avoided	the	term	“military	government”	including	a	US	Department	of	State	study	in	1950	which	claimed,	“the	Soviet	military	occupation	was	not	permitted	to	waste	its	energies	in	the	morass	of	military	government,	using	instead	selective	and	covert	forms	of	control	while	focusing	their	effort	on	the	creation	of	a	strong	indigenous	regime.”29		These	contradictory	accounts	and	debates	on	the	fundamental	character	of	the	SCA	were	further	complicated	by	revisionist	accounts,	which	downplayed	its	role	on	the	peninsula.	Historians	such	as	Cummings	and	Armstrong	for	example	both	argue	that	the	Soviet	Union	was	never	
																																								 																				
27	Andrej	N.	Lankov,	From	Stalin	to	Kim	Il	Sung:	The	Formation	of	North	Korea,	1945-1960.	(New	Brunswick,	NJ:	Rutgers	University	Press,	2002),	12	28	Dae-Sook	Suh,	Kim	Il	Sung:	The	North	Korean	Leader	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	1988),	35	29	Erik	Van.	Ree,	Socialism	in	One	Zone:	Stalin’s	Policy	in	Korea,	1945-1947	(Oxford:	Berg,	1989),	67	
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able	to	dominate	the	local	Korean	power	organs	through	the	SCA.30	Some	revisionists	also	emphasize	the	cooperation	between	the	Koreans	and	the	USSR,	such	as	Michael	Seth	who	argues	that	by	working	with	the	people’s	committees	the	SCA	was	able	to	carry	out	a	relatively	smooth	and	peaceful	transfer	of	power.31	
While	archival	documents	now	clearly	show	that	the	SCA	played	a	prominent	role	in	effectively	controlling	North	Korea	from	1945	until	the	establishment	of	the	Democratic	Peoples	Republic	of	Korea	in	1948,	fundamental	questions	regarding	the	power	balance	and	its	relationship	with	North	Korea	still	remain.	Many	post-revisionists	have	made	strong	arguments	that	point	to	the	fact	that	the	Soviet	Union	failed	to	establish	hegemonic	control	in	the	early	stages	of	occupation	due	mostly	to	political	unpreparedness	and	the	fact	that	Stalin’s	ambitions	were	limited	in	the	region.	Moreover,	archival	documents	show	that	Stalin’s	focus	was	quickly	concentrated	away	from	the	South	as	the	Soviet	Union	attempted	to	tighten	its	grip	over	the	North.	While	the	current	consensus	among	historians	has	been	that	the	Soviet	Union	failed	to	establish	immediate	hegemonic	control,	it	is	unclear	to	what	extent	Soviet	policy	pursued	it	in	the	first	place.	Kathryn	Weathersby	for	instance	argues	that	the	Soviet	Union	sought	pervasive	control	on	the	peninsula	and	its	policies	were	carefully	calculated	and	meant	to	protect	its	economic	and	strategic	interests	through	a	“traditional	Tsarist	approach	of	maintaining	a	balance	of	power	
																																								 																				30	Cumings,	Bruce.	The	Origins	of	the	Korean	War.	Seoul.:	Yuksabipyungsa,	2002;	122;	Charles	K.	Armstrong,	The	North	Korean	Revolution:	1945-1950.	(Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press,	2013;	38		31	Michael	J.	Seth,	A	Concise	History	of	Modern	Korea:	From	the	Late	Nineteenth	Century	to	the	Present	(Lanham,	MD:	Rowman	&	Littlefield,	2016),	36.	
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in	Korea.”32	Weathersby’s	assessment	regarding	the	USSR’s	motives	compliments	orthodox	accounts	as	she	builds	off	of	earlier	assumptions	that	Soviet	policy	was	firmly	rooted	in	old	tsarist	interests	and	approaches.33	Historians	such	as	Lankov	however	disagree	that	there	was	a	clear	approach	by	the	Soviet	Union	or	that	its	policies	were	grounded	in	tsarist	interests.	While	Lankov	reasserts	the	Soviet	Union’s	economic	and	defense	interests	in	Korea,	he	emphasizes	that	the	Soviet	Union	did	not	have	a	real	plan	on	the	peninsula	and	instead,	at	least	until	1947,	relied	on	loose	control	and	supervision	by	its	military.	According	to	Lankov,		“Soviet	policy	in	Korea	was	to	a	very	large	extent	a	result	of	improvisation	and	ad	hoc	decisions.”34	Charles	Armstrong	echoes	this	claim	in	assessing	that	“events	in	North	Korea	often	ran	ahead	of	Moscow’s	plans.”35	A	memorandum	dated	January	11,	1946	to	Terentii	Shtykov,	the	head	of	the	Soviet	Civil	Administration	and	de-facto	leader	of	North	Korea,	strongly	supports	this	theory.	The	memorandum	outlines	the	first	several	months	of	Soviet	occupation	and	concludes	that	the	Red	Army	had	little	to	no	control	over	the	territory	and	was	“unfamiliar	with	army	political	work	and	completely	inexperienced	in	questions	of	political	work	among	a	civilian	population,	particularly	a	foreign	population.”36	According	to	the	document,	not	only	were	the	
																																								 																				
32	Weathersby,	Kathryn.	“	The	Soviet	Role	in	the	Early	Phase	of	the	Korean	War:	New	Documentary	Evidence”	The	Journal	of	American-East	Asian	Relations,	Vol.	2,	No.	4	(Winter	1993),	431	
33	Dae-Sook	Suh,	Kim	Il	Sung,	9	
34	Andrej	N.	Lankov,	From	Stalin	to	Kim	Il	Sung:	The	Formation	of	North	Korea,	1945-1960.	(New	Brunswick,	NJ:	Rutgers	University	Press,	2002),	26	35	Charles	K.	Armstrong,	The	North	Korean	Revolution:	1945-1950.	(Ithaca:	Cornell	University	Press,	2013),	26	36“Untitled	memorandum	on	the	political	and	morale	situation	of	Soviet	troops	in	North	Korea	and	the	economic	situation	in	Korea,”	January	11,	1946,	History	and	Public	Policy	
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Soviets	ineffective	at	maintaining	power	in	urban	areas,	they	had	no	contact	with	rural	district	administrations	which	represented	the	largest	percentage	of	the	population,	as	they	did	not	“interest	themselves	in	the	life	and	situation	of	the	Korean	countryside.”37	This	unpreparedness	was	due	to	the	fact	that	in	the	first	year	of	occupation,	the	Soviet	Union	saw	North	Korea	simply	as	a	conquered	territory	to	loot	and	had	not	yet	established	a	firm	policy	regarding	the	peninsula.		The	fact	that	the	SCA	had	failed	to	tap	into	the	rural	district	administrations	also	shows	a	severe	miscalculation	of	the	country’s	political	situation,	and	provides	further	evidence	of	the	USSR’s	assumption	that	the	Koreans	were	not	ready	for	self-rule.		These	miscalculations	and	unpreparedness	precluded	successful	cooperation	between	the	USSR	and	North	Koreans	in	the	occupied	peninsula.	
COMMUNIZING	THE	NORTH:	THE	SCA	AND	KOREAN	COMMUNIST	GROUPS	(1945	
TO	1946)	Archival	documents	from	the	early	period	of	occupation	also	illustrate	the	USSR’s	initial	misreading	of	the	communist	presence	on	the	peninsula	and	a	clear	shift	in	focus	away	from	communist	groups	in	the	South.	From	1945	to	1946,	the	SCA	focused	its	policies	on	maintaining	control	in	the	North	and	completely	ignored	developments	in	the	South.	This	sharp	policy	shift	is	apparent	in	three	documents	from	1945	to	1946,	which	offer	a	glimpse	into	the	drastically	shifting	Soviet	interests	in	the	early	stages	of	occupation.	The	documents	also	highlight	the	multiple	layers	within	Soviet	policy	and	archival	material,	offering	insight	into	the	
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contrasting	assessments	of	events	in	Korea	made	within	diplomatic	circles	in	the	Soviet	Union	and	among	Soviet	officials	in	the	SCA.		
In	a	report	conducted	by	the	SCA,	which	sketched	the	existing	communist	movement	in	the	North	and	South	in	1945,	the	authors	concluded	that	while	they	were	the	most	influential	party	throughout	the	peninsula,	they	“turned	out	to	have	neither	the	proper	leaders	nor	a	clear	and	specific	platform.”38	The	report	also	highlighted	the	need	for	Soviet	policy	to	concern	itself	with	communist	groups	in	the	South	which,	while	powerful,	were	competing	with	a	larger	Democratic	party	that	represented	“big	landowners	and	capitalists”	and	“openly	engaged	in	pro-imperialist	and	anti-Communist	propaganda.”39	An	assessment	of	Korea	written	by	Soviet	diplomat	Yakov	Malik	in	1945	also	concluded	that	while	the	communists	in	the	North	had	increased	their	influence,	there	was	a	“noticeable	tendency”	of	the	American	authorities	in	limiting	the	political	activity	of	communists	in	the	South.40	An	obvious	difference	in	the	documents	however	was	that	while	the	SCA	report	pointed	out	numerous	insufficiencies	among	the	northern	communist	organizations,	Malik’s	report	was	far	more	optimistic	and	makes	no	mentions	of	these	points.	This	is	a	result	of	the	intended	audiences	of	the	documents,	as	the	SCA	report	was	top	secret,	while	Malik’s	report	was	meant	for	dissemination	among	larger	diplomatic	
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circles	in	the	Soviet	Union.	Therefore,	while	both	documents	reveal	Soviet	policy	focusing	heavily	on	the	southern	communist	movement,	the	SCA	report	reveals	the	realities	of	the	Soviets	Union’s	control	in	the	North.	
In	contrast	to	the	1945	documents,	a	1946	SCA	report	assessing	the	political	and	economic	situation,	painted	a	far	more	pessimistic	assessment	of	the	communist	movement	in	the	North,	and	entirely	excluded	the	South.	In	the	report,	Lieutenant	Colonel	Fedorov	and	Major	Livshits	outline	the	serious	weaknesses	of	the	northern	communist	movement,	including	the	fact	that	there	were	“no	communists	in	the	villages”	and	that	the	organizations	had	failed	to	attract	workers	or	peasants.	The	report	concludes	by	prescribing	a	purge	within	the	party,	adding	that,	“in	the	present	situation	the	Korean	Communist	Party	…	is	problematical	at	the	very	least…there	is	still	no	order	in	their	own	house.	Organizationally	it	is	still	a	very	loose	and	motley	mass	choked	with	alien	elements.”41	Noticeably	absent	is	any	mention	of	the	southern	communist	movement	and	other	documents	from	1946	to	1948	do	not	make	any	more	mentions	of	Soviet	policy	thinking	or	deliberation	on	this	issue.	As	historian	Armstrong	argues,	Stalin	ordered	restraint	within	North	Korea,	as	he	was	extremely	cautious	of	provoking	the	United	States	by	supporting	revolution	in	the	South.42	Armstrong	also	places	emphasis	on	the	fact	that	Stalin	ignored	the	South	due	to	the	fact	that	supporting	the	southern	communists	wouldn’t	contribute	to	maintaining	Soviet	control	over	the	North,	which	was	the	USSR’s	
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primary	focus.	43	However,	it	is	evident	from	the	1945	and	1946	reports	that	this	decision	also	arose	from	the	fact	that	the	Soviet	Union	had	miscalculated	the	feasibility	of	a	strong	communist	government	in	the	North.	Therefore,	the	USSR’s	neglect	of	southern	communists	and	cooperation	with	the	United	States	can	also	be	explained	as	a	consequence	of	its	focus	on	the	issues	within	its	own	zone	of	occupation.	By	1946	the	Soviet	Union	had	begun	to	consolidate	its	interests	in	the	peninsula	and,	acknowledging	its	failures,	focused	on	tightening	its	grip	on	North	Korea.	
PROVISIONAL	PARTY	AND	SOVIET	PEOPLES	DEMOCRACY	(1946	–	1948)	
Unfortunately,	of	the	available	Soviet	politburo	documents	from	1946	–	1948,	only	a	small	fraction	make	any	mention	of	Korea.	One	of	the	inferences	that	can	be	made	from	this	is	that	the	SCA	was	given	a	high	level	of	autonomy,	and	was	allowed	to	decide	on	and	implement	policies	with	little	oversight.44	Since	military	documents	are	almost	completely	inaccessible	however,	the	result	has	been	a	significant	gap	of	information	for	scholars	of	Soviet-North	Korean	relations	in	this	period,	especially	in	1948	when	the	Soviet	government	officially	withdrew	from	Korea.	The	documents	that	are	available	however	are	significant	in	that	they	help	shed	light	on	Stalin’s	relationship	with	North	Korea	vis-à-vis	the	SCA	and	suggest	that	Stalin	gave	an	unusual	amount	of	independence	to	the	SCA,	deferring	to	Shtykov	on	matters	of	Korean	affairs.	While	the	USSR	had	begun	to	tighten	its	grip	over	the	North	in	1946	
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and	closely	controlled	the	growth	of	the	communist	party,	by	1947	it	had	become	less	directly	and	less	aggressively	involved	in	Korea.	
Due	to	the	USSR’s	belief	that	the	Korean	people	were	not	ready	for	self-rule	and	its	awareness	of	the	limitations	of	the	local	communists,	they	did	not	officially	recognize	any	local	group	that	claimed	to	represent	the	people	as	the	legitimate	government.45	Instead,	they	decided	to	import	communist	leaders	who	were	neither	independent	nor	too	far	removed	from	Soviet	control.	Established	under	direct	supervision	in	December	1945,	the	Provisional	People's	Committee	for	North	Korea	was	lead	by	Kim	Il	Sung,	a	Korean	guerrilla	fighter	and	a	Major	in	the	Soviet	Red	Army,	who	was	handpicked	by	Marshal	of	the	Soviet	Union	Lavrentiy	Beria	and	supported	by	Terentii	Shtykov,	head	of	the	SCA.46	By	February	1946,	the	SCA	officially	handed	over	its	authority	to	Kim	and	the	Provisional	People’s	Committee	for	North	Korea,	which	brought	its	de	facto	control	to	an	end.	While	the	exact	structure	of	power	sharing	after	this	transfer	is	not	made	clear	from	the	archives,	the	SCA	continued	to	maintain	a	strong	level	of	influence	in	Korea,	and	as	Lankov	argues,	“at	the	very	least	it	gave	Moscow	full	information	on	what	was	going	on	in	North	Korea.47	The	Soviet	Union	further	maintained	control	within	the	newly	formed	provisional	government.	Although	the	government	consisted	of	a	number	of	different	factions	of	communist	groups,	including	former	guerrilla	fighters,	domestic	communist	groups	and	those	loyal	to	China,	the	strongest	camp	was	the	Soviet	faction,	with	Kim	IL	Sung	at	its	helm.		
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While	the	general	consensus	among	recent	historians	has	been	that	Stalin	showed	restraint	on	the	peninsula,	there	have	been	varying	inferences	made	on	the	Soviet	Union’s	commitment	and	contribution	to	developing	a	communist	revolution	in	Korea.	Historians	such	as	Armstrong	for	example,	emphasize	that	the	Soviet	Union	did	not	play	the	most	important	role	in	the	development	of	the	communist	party	in	North	Korea.	He	highlights	that	communism	had	already	become	an	important	part	of	the	political	discourse	of	anti-colonial	resistance	in	Korea,	adding	that	“the	DPRK	was	more	than	a	revolution	from	abroad,	imposed	by	the	fiat	of	the	Soviet	occupation,	but	was	shaped	by	local	circumstances	and	recent	historical	legacies.”48	Cummings	also	makes	similar	assertions	and	supports	the	idea	that	the	communist	party	arose	in	spite	of	any	Soviet	involvement.	Both	historians	make	strong	cases	for	Korean	agency	in	the	emergence	of	the	communist	party	however	they	err	by	bolstering	their	arguments	with	the	idea	that	the	Soviets	allowed	a	democratic	party	in	Korea	to	form	with	multiple	parties	including	nationalist	and	religious	groups.49	This	argument	that	the	Soviet	Union	facilitated	the	establishment	of	a	democratic	government,	and	therefore	that	communism	arose	naturally,	is	fundamentally	flawed	and	ignores	the	USSR’s	direct	involvement	in	shaping	the	movement	in	North	Korea.	More	recently,	historians	have	pointed	to	a	model,	initially	proposed	by	British	historian	Hugh	Seton-Watson,	in	which	communists	groups,	supported	by	the	Soviet	Union,	would	attempt	to	gain	power	in	three	stages:	a	real	coalition	with	other	parties,	a	bogus	coalition	in	which	communists	would	
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subvert	power,	and	a	final	stage	in	which	they	would	establish	hegemonic	control.50	Lankov	applies	this	model	to	Korea,	arguing	that	it	closely	resembled	the	early	stages	of	socialist	development	in	North	Korea,	when	Stalin	and	his	ideologists	devised	the	theoretical	concept	of	a	“People’s	Democracy.”51	In	this	concept,	the	Soviet	Union	would	first	pursue	policies	of	cooperation	and	moderation	by	establishing	broad	democratic	revolutions,	which	would	include	numerous	political	groups.	However,	this	initial	stage	was	not	seen	as	a	permanent	state	in	the	political	evolution	but	rather	a	“transitional	type	of	system,	the	principle	function	of	which	is	the	construction	of	socialism.”52	In	the	Korean	context,	this	cooperation	could	be	seen	in	the	Provisional	government,	which	consisted	of	141,000	members	in	the	Democratic	Party	and	only	43,000	in	the	Communist	Party.53	While	on	the	surface	this	had	made	it	seem	that	the	provisional	government	had	fair	representation,	the	USSR	appointed	communist	leaders	to	the	other	parties	to	ensure	their	compliance.54	Therefore,	while	the	Soviet	Union	encouraged	cooperation	and	tolerated	non-communist	parties	within	the	United	Democratic	National	Front,	under	the	guise	of	political	pluralism,	in	reality	they	had	little	to	no	independence	and	were	quickly	weakened	and	eliminated	by	the	communists.	
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Another	argument	brought	forward,	and	one	especially	prominent	in	revisionist	accounts,	is	that	Stalin	ordered	restraint	by	North	Koreans	against	landlords	and	didn’t	support	major	socialist	reforms.	These	historians	point	to	a	document	written	by	Stalin	in	1945,	which	asserted	that	Koreans	would	have	political	independence	and	argue	that	the	early	reforms	made	by	the	provisional	government	were	nationalist	in	origin	and	involved	little	to	no	Soviet	involvement.55	These	perspectives	tend	to	highlight	Soviet	cooperation	and	Korean	agency	in	North	Korean	political	life.	For	example,	historian	Chong-Sik	Lee	points	to	the	1946	North	Korean	Land	Reform	Laws	which	emphasized	that	the	property	of	Japanese	occupiers	and	collaborators	was	to	be	nationalized,	therefore	making	the	reforms	a	nationalist,	rather	than	a	socialist,	program.56	This	argument	attempts	to	distance	the	political	developments	in	1946	from	direct	Soviet	interference,	however	it	ignores	the	fact	that	in	practice	the	majority	of	large	and	medium	sized	industries	were	forced	to	collaborate	with	the	Japanese,	and	therefore	the	reforms	were	socialist	in	practice.57	Furthermore,	recent	documents	have	shown	the	constant	involvement	of	the	SCA	in	the	Provisional	Government,	including	their	drafting	of	Kim	IL	Sung’s	speech	to	the	congress	of	the	Workers	Party	of	North	Korea	in	1946,	which	outlined	the	land	reform	laws.	58	
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While	the	Soviet	government	clearly	played	a	prominent	role	in	establishing	a	friendly	regime,	by	1947	primary	documents	show	a	waning	interest,	as	well	as	the	increased	role	that	the	SCA	played.	A	recently	declassified	1947	ciphered	telegram	from	Shtykov	to	Stalin	is	indicative	of	the	Soviet	Civil	Administration’s	role	in	Soviet-	North	Korean	relations,	as	well	as	Stalin’s	and	the	Politburo’s	loosening	of	their	direct	involvement	in	the	region.	In	the	telegram,	Shtykov	directly	addressed	the	Politburo,	asserting	the	need	for	86	Soviet	engineers	and	specialists	to	build	railroads	after	having	spent	6	months	pleading	with	the	Soviet	government	to	no	avail.	59What	is	immediately	striking	about	the	telegram	is	its	direct	and	instructive	language.	In	the	post	war	period	Stalin	recast	the	Politburo	to	fit	with	his	personal	habits,	and	all	decisions	necessitated	his	approval,	with	the	Politburo	retaining	very	little,	if	any	freedom	of	initiative.	60	This	created	a	culture	of	deference	within	the	politburo,	and	Stalin’s	inferiors	avoided	giving	him	direct	instructions.	As	evidenced	in	numerous	archival	documents,	subordinates	would	only	suggest	policies	to	Stalin,	always	deferring	to	him	on	the	final	word.	The	language	in	Shtykov’s	telegram	however	is	unique	in	its	directness	and	instructs	Stalin	that	he	“needs”	to	employ	the	policies	being	suggested.61	This	suggests	several	key	points	in	the	relationships	between	the	Soviet	government,	the	SCA	and	North	Korea.	Firstly,	it	indicates	that	Stalin	deferred	to	Shtykov	and	the	SCA	on	Korean	affairs.	Secondly,	it	suggests	that	the	Soviet	government	was	not	strongly	committed	to	political	matters	in	Korea,	as	
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Shtykov	complained	that	on	several	occasions	the	Soviet	government	outright	refused	his	requests	and	then	ignored	him	for	over	6	months.	Finally,	in	his	warning	to	Stalin,	Shtykov	highlighted	the	fact	that	if	“Soviet	specialists	are	not	in	North	Korea	before	the	reunification	of	North	and	South	Korea	…		it	will	be	inevitable	that	the	Korean	temporary	government,	…	will	invite	American	specialists”,	further	adding	that	this	would	lead	to	a	strengthening	of	American	influence	in	Korea	and	a	detriment	to	Soviet	interests	in	the	region.62	This	warning	is	revealing	not	only	because	it	indicates	Stalin’s	fears	of	increased	American	influence	on	the	peninsula,	but	also	that	from	the	perspective	of	the	SCA,	an	eventual	reunification	was	inevitable.	It	is	also	an	example	of	a	tactic	used	by	both	the	SCA	and	Kim	Il	Sung	in	pushing	Stalin	to	become	more	heavily	involved	in	the	region,	discussed	more	in	depth	below.	Shtykov’s	warning	indicates	that	by	1947	the	SCA	had	begun	to	see	reunification	as	not	only	a	possibility,	but	inevitable	in	the	near	future.	
The	period	from	late	1947	through	1948	is	the	least	accessible	in	the	archival	material	due	to	the	fact	that	the	daily	management	of	North	Korean	affairs	was	conducted	by	the	SCA	by	this	point.	The	actions	of	the	SCA	are	largely	unavailable	to	historians	since	almost	all	communication	was	internal	and	Shtykov	rarely	discussed	policy	with	Stalin.63	As	a	memo	to	the	Secretary	of	the	Communist	Party	of	the	Soviet	Union	explained,		“The	Foreign	Relations	Department	has	not,	to	the	present	time,	been	receiving	regular	and	detailed	information	about	the	situation	in	Korea	because	the	[SCA]	located	in	Pyongyang,	send	all	the	information	to	their	
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respective	Departments.”64	The	immediate	inference	to	be	drawn	is	that	by	this	point,	Stalin	heavily	relied	on	Shtykov	to	oversee	the	new	North	Korean	provisional	government	and	diffused	an	unprecedented	amount	of	power	to	the	SCA.	There	are	however	two	major	exceptions	where	Stalin	was	directly	involved	in	the	management	of	North	Korea.	In	February	1948,	Stalin	and	the	Politburo	drafted	the	Provisional	Government	Constitution,	and	later	in	April,	met	again,	to	discuss	the	establishment	of	an	independent	North	Korean	State	and	reject	the	results	of	the	South	Korean	elections.65	However,	these	two	actions	were	focused	on	solidifying	a	separate	government	in	the	North,	thereby	preventing	a	peaceful	reunification.	
On	September	18,	1948,	the	Soviet	Union	announced	to	North	Korea	that	it	would	officially	withdraw	all	troops	from	North	Korea	by	the	end	of	the	year.	The	final	withdrawal	was	completed	on	December	15,	1948	with	approximately	200	military	advisors	remaining	in	the	North.	66	Although	the	withdrawal	was	made	ostensibly	to	remove	foreign	influence	from	Korea,	the	Soviet	Union	was	fully	aware	that	the	creation	of	two	separate	governments	precluded	a	reunification	of	the	peninsula.67	At	this	point,	Soviet	policy	was	still	ill	defined,	and	focused	on	
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maintaining	influence	over	the	North	rather	than	developing	any	serious	plans	towards	reunification.		
STALIN’S	POLICY	“SHIFT”	AND	THE	“CHANGED	INTERNATIONAL	SITUATION”	
(1949-1950)	
After	the	withdrawal	in	late	1948,	a	critical	point	of	contention	for	Soviet	foreign	policy	in	Korea	was	the	disparity	between	the	Soviet	Union’s	restrained	attitude	and	the	highly	nationalistic	Korean	communists	who	were	determined	to	extend	their	authority	over	the	entire	peninsula.68	Despite	constant	pleas	for	an	invasion	from	Kim	IL	Sung,	Stalin	rejected	his	ambitions,	and	maintained	a	cautious	policy.	However,	on	May	14,	1950	Stalin	seemingly	made	a	dramatic	shift	when,	in	a	telegram	to	Mao,	he	confirmed	his	agreement	with	North	Korea	on	the	proposal	to	invade	South	Korea.	The	telegram	was	brief	and	did	not	outline	Stalin’s	rationale,	but	rather	gave	a	vague	assertion	that	due	to	the	“changed	international	situation”	the	Soviet	Union	agreed	with	the	proposal	of	Kim	IL	Sung	to	“move	toward	reunification.”69	What	Stalin	meant	by	the	altered	international	situation	continues	to	remain	at	the	center	of	debate	among	Korean	War	historians.	A	variety	of	theories	have	been	proposed	which	debate	the	factors	that	influenced	Stalin’s	decision	and	whether	he	acted	pre-emptively	out	of	a	sense	of	inferiority	and	fear	of	a	southern	
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led	invasion,	or	whether	he	was	bolstered	by	the	increased	offensive	capabilities	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	North	Korea.	Archival	materials	show	that	Stalin’s	initial	decision	to	pursue	an	invasion	were	motivated	by	fears	of	a	southern	led	invasion	and	the	increasing	strength	of	the	South,	however	he	only	chose	to	officially	confirm	an	invasion	once	he	was	sure	that	a	quick	victory	could	be	ensured	with	Chinese	assistance,	and	limited	or	no	American	involvement.		
Furthermore,	although	archival	materials	have	not	shed	much	light	on	Stalin’s	specific	considerations,	they	have	illuminated	the	path	that	Soviet	foreign	policy	took	from	the	early	months	of	1949	until	the	invasion’s	approval	in	May	1950.		While	the	decision	to	invade	has	been	labelled	by	a	number	of	historians	as	a	dramatic	shift	or	a	“U-Turn”	in	foreign	policy,	it	is	clear	from	records	that	the	decision	was	a	logical	step	that	was	carefully	planned	and	arose	from	a	cautious	but	opportunistic	policy.70	Some	historians,	such	as	Anatoly	Torkunov,	have	gone	further	and	argued	that	up	until	1950,	Stalin	still	seriously	considered	pursuing	a	peaceful	reunification	of	the	Korean	peninsula.71	In	reality,	Stalin	had	already	begun	to	accept	the	idea	of	assisting	Kim	in	a	military	campaign	early	in	1949.	However	Stalin’s	decision	centered	heavily	on	assessments	of	the	potential	of	American	intervention	and	the	strength	of	the	North	Korean	military	vis-à-vis	South	Korea.	Stalin	wanted	to	avoid	a	protracted	conflict	with	minimal	foreign	interference,	therefore	his	denials	of	Kim’s	multiple	requests	for	invasion	throughout	1949	were	never	outright,	but	rather	always	conditional	and	issued	on	the	basis	of	
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unfavourable	timing.	To	this	end,	Stalin	relied	heavily	on	Kim	IL	Sung	and	the	SCA	for	information	on	political	and	military	matters	on	the	Korean	Peninsula,	which	Kim	took	full	advantage	of	to	push	a	narrative	of	conflicts	at	the	border,	instigated	by	the	South.	By	fuelling	the	idea	that	a	conflict	was	inevitable,	Kim	worked	to	further	convince	Stalin	of	the	necessity	for	a	pre-emptive	invasion,	while	at	the	same	time	alleviating	Stalin’s	largest	concern	of	a	potential	American	response.	Stalin	was	not	as	convinced	of	the	urgency	as	Kim,	as	illustrated	by	his	somewhat	restrained	attitude	and	decision	not	to	invade	in	1949.	However	Kim’s	influence	played	a	large	role	in	Soviet	decision-making	in	Korea,	specifically	in	Stalin’s	assessment	of	American	intervention.		
Traditional	narratives	regarding	Stalin’s	decision	for	invasion	in	1950	have	generally	centered	on	the	increased	offensive	capabilities	of	the	Soviet	Union,	which	arose	primarily	from	the	victory	of	the	Chinese	Communist	Party	in	the	civil	war	and	the	USSR’s	first	successful	test	of	the	atomic	bomb	at	the	end	of	1949.	Anatoly	Torkunov	argues	for	example	that	Stalin	felt	emboldened	after	the	acquisition	of	the	atomic	bomb	and	felt	he	had	been	given	a	free	hand	in	Korea	since	he	believed	that	the	Soviet	Union’s	atomic	capabilities	would	deter	US	Intervention	in	the	Far	East.72	Other	historians,	including	the	authors	of	“Uncertain	Partners”,	have	even	suggested	that	the	turn	towards	Asia	was	insincere	and	these	capabilities	gave	Stalin	the	impetus	to	divert	military	attention	away	from	Europe.73	This	argument	has	
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recently	been	revived	after	the	release	of	a	letter	in	which	Stalin	retroactively	assessed	the	initial	decisions	for	an	invasion	with	a	communist	ally.	However,	as	will	be	discussed	in	detail	below,	the	document	is	not	a	credible	resource	as	it	sharply	deviates	from	the	other	available	material.	Furthermore,	the	investment	made	by	Stalin	is	also	supported	by	the	sheer	economic	contributions	that	the	Soviet	Union	made	to	North	Korea	from	1945	to	1949,	the	numerous	cultural	and	political	agreements,	as	well	as	the	newly	revealed	extent	of	military	support	provided	during	the	initial	invasion.74	
Not	only	do	these	narratives	rely	on	biasedly	culled	material,	they	also	fail	to	account	for	the	Soviet	foreign	policy	failures	at	the	time	that	contributed	to	Stalin’s	shifting	attention	towards	Asia	as	well	as	Stalin’s	insecurities	of	an	inevitable	southern	led	invasion.	As	Soviet	foreign	policy	expert	Samuel	Jr.	Wells	notes,	prior	to	1949,	the	Soviet	Union’s	primary	foreign	policy	goals	were	to	prevent	the	establishment	of	a	western	defensive	alliance	in	Europe,	which	included	the	United	States,	and	to	block	the	creation	of	a	separate	West	German	government.75	By	early	1949,	these	policy	goals	were	defeated	after	the	establishment	of	NATO	and	the	Federal	Republic	of	Germany,	which	influenced	Stalin	to	focus	more	economic	and	military	resources	in	Asia.	Another	aspect	that	many	of	these	narratives	either	miss	entirely	or	downplay	was	the	insecurity	among	the	Soviet	leadership	of	a	southern	led	invasion.	As	Torkunov	notes,	“up	to	the	end	of	1949	…		[Stalin]	experienced	a	
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growing	fear	that	the	opposing	side	would	violate	peace	and	attack	North	Korea.”76	Among	his	allies	Stalin	acted	seemingly	unconcerned	of	the	ROK,	even	joking	in	a	meeting	with	Kim	in	March	1949	that	he	had	nothing	to	fear	of	the	“puny	southern	army.”77	However,	in	his	internal	communication	amongst	the	politburo,	he	frequently	worried	about	the	strength	of	the	ROK,	even	reprimanding	Shtykov	for	failing	to	report	clashes	at	the	border.78	
How	heavily	Stalin	weighed	each	individual	factor	though,	cannot	be	ascertained	as	Stalin	kept	no	personal	diary,	nor	were	there	any	documents	indicating	policy	debates	among	the	politburo.79	However,	the	explanations	for	Stalin’s	decisions	need	not	be	mutually	exclusive,	as	the	archival	material	shows	that	they	were	all	seriously	considered	in	the	decision	to	invade.	What	is	also	made	clear	by	the	archival	material	is	that	Stalin’s	decision	was	neither	a	dramatic	shift,	as	some	historians	have	depicted,	nor	was	it	a	reluctantly	sanctioned	attack.		By	1949,	Stalin	had	already	abandoned	his	policy	to	preserve	the	status	quo,	and	actively	monitored	the	Korean	situation	to	find	an	opportunity	to	support	and	plan	a	rapid	invasion	of	the	South.		
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Although	Stalin	was	opportunistic	and	desired	an	eventual	absorption	of	South	Korea,	he	maintained	peaceful	reunification	as	a	possible,	though	increasingly	unlikely,	option.	While	Stalin	did	not	officially	change	his	on-going	policy	of	non-aggression,	as	early	as	March/April	1949	there	was	a	clear	shift	away	from	restraint	during	which	time	the	Soviet	Union	extensively	built	up	North	Korea	militarily	and	economically.80	This	shift	was	heavily	influenced	by	both	the	SCA	and	Kim	IL	Sung	exploited	the	conflicts	at	the	border	in	order	to	instill	a	fear	in	Stalin	of	a	southern	led	invasion,	and	eliminating	a	peaceful	reunification	as	a	likely	scenario.	This	fear	was	propagated	throughout	early	1949	by	numerous	reports	of	increased	clashes	along	the	border	between	the	armies	of	the	North	and	South,	as	well	as	the	increased	buildup	of	southern	forces.	Stalin	took	these	reports	seriously,	exhibited	by	his	response	to	one	on	April	20th	of	significant	numbers	of	violations	from	South	Koreans	over	the	38th	parallel,	in	which	he	advised	that	the	North	Koreans	should	begin	preparations	for	more	provocative	actions	from	the	South.81	Shtykov	continued	to	send	numerous	cables	to	Stalin	maintaining	that	an	invasion	of	North	Korea	would	result	in	a	swift	and	decisive	victory	at	very	little	cost	to	the	South.82		On	May	2,	1949,	Shtykov	heavily	pushed	an	alarmist	narrative	of	an	impending	attack	by	the	South	reporting	that	in	connection	with	military	intrusions	of	the	North,	the	ROK	was	dramatically	growing	in	size	and	was	being	concentrated	along	
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the	38th	parallel,	highlighting	that	“the	South	Korean	authorities	are	paying	special	attention	to	the	Pyongyang	direction.”83		He	also	highlighted	the	extent	of	aid	provided	by	America,	as	well	as	a	purge	of	unreliable	soldiers	in	the	Republic	of	Korea	Army	(ROK)	being	replaced	with	“reactionary	youth”.84	Further	fueling	Stalin’s	fears,	he	added	that	an	operation	by	the	South	had	already	been	planned	and	passed	on	to	commanders	and	“supposedly	planned	for	the	month	of	June.”85	He	even	fueled	fears	of	a	southern	conspiracy	suggesting	that	“[a]gents	of	the	South	have	set	up	terrorist	and	subversive	groups	in	every	province	in	the	North,	which	are	ordered	to	recruit	new	members,	conduct	espionage,	and	draft	plans	for	uprisings.”86	He	finally	concluded	that	North	Korea	“did	not	have	enough	trained	personnel,	adequate	weapons…	to	rebuke	intensifying	excursions	from	the	South.”87	Though	Shtykov’s	reports	were	not	entirely	fabricated,	Katheryn	Weathersby	argues	they	heavily	exaggerated	the	actual	situation	at	the	border	and	undoubtedly	influenced	Stalin	to	abandon	his	belief	in	a	peaceful	reunification.88	Throughout	the	rest	of	1949,	Stalin	came	to	see	military	reunification	as	not	only	likely,	but	inevitable.		
To	this	end	one	of	the	important	factors	under	consideration	by	Stalin	was	the	support	of	China,	as	he	did	not	want	to	shoulder	the	responsibility	for	a	
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prolonged	conflict,	which	could	damage	Soviet	reputation.	As	Richard	Peters	and	Xiaobing	Li	argue,	this	support	was	a	prerequisite	for	any	invasion	plans,	as	Stalin	would	have	nothing	to	lose	since	“the	onus	of	the	attack	would	fall	on	Mao	and	Kim,	regardless	of	its	success	or	US	reaction."89	On	May	18,	1949	this	support	was	tentatively	given	through	a	telegram	from	Kovalev,	leader	of	a	group	of	Soviet	specialists	in	Northeast	China,	to	the	Soviet	Council	of	Ministers.	In	it,	Mao	relayed	a	message	to	the	Soviet	Union,	confirming	a	drastic	increase	in	aid	to	North	Korea	and	promising	that	if	a	war	between	the	North	and	South	broke	out,	China	would	do	everything	within	its	power	to	support	North	Korea.90	Mao	also	advised	Kovalev	that	Kim	should	wait	until	an	opportune	moment	to	strike,	detailing	“an	attack	by	North	Korea	on	the	South	might	be	mounted	at	the	beginning	of	1950	if	the	situation	at	the	beginning	of	1950	favors	this.”91	For	Stalin,	this	expression	of	support	and	affirmation	that	an	attack	could	be	mounted	at	an	appropriate	time,	helped	to	solidify	his	resolve	of	the	invasion’s	inevitability.		
By	September	1949,	the	SCA	reports,	Kim’s	pleas	and	China’s	affirmation	of	support	influenced	Stalin	to	again	seriously	consider	assisting	North	Korea	in	a	military	campaign.	In	a	September	11	telegram	from	Deputy	Soviet	Foreign	Minister	Andrei	Gromyko	to	the	Soviet	Embassy	in	Pyongyang,	the	Soviet	Union	attempted	to	ascertain	the	military	and	political	ramifications	of	a	northern	led	invasion.	The	
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letter	relayed	a	message	from	Stalin	urging	an	immediate	meeting	with	Kim	in	order	to	probe	him	regarding	the	strength	of	the	ROK	and	the	Northern	Army,	the	conditions	of	the	partisan	movement	in	the	South	and	what	kind	of	measures	the	Americans	could	potentially	take	in	response	to	a	northern	invasion.92	This	was	the	first	serious	attempt	by	the	Soviet	Union	to	consider	the	proposal	of	invasion.	However,	by	September	14,	after	discussing	these	questions	with	the	North	Koreans,	the	SCA	had	advised	Stalin	that	it	was	politically	disadvantageous	to	attack	as	the	North	would	be	seen	as	aggressors,	and	moreover	that	a	quick	victory	would	not	be	possible	due	to	military	insufficiencies.	93	The	SCA	furthermore	highlighted	a	fear	that	a	prolonged	conflict	would	give	“the	possibility	to	the	Americans	to	render	corresponding	aid	to	Rhee…	the	Americans	probably	will	intervene	in	Korean	affairs	more	decisively	than	they	did	in	China	and	…	apply	all	their	strength	to	save	Rhee.”94	A	document	from	September	24,	1949	reaffirmed	and	further	elucidated	the	Politburo’s	decision	against	invasion	citing	the	North	Korean	military’s	inferiority,	the	lack	of	a	partisan	movement	in	South	Korea,	and	the	potential	of	American	interference.95	However,	although	Stalin	again	rejected	plans	for	an	invasion,	it	is	important	that	it	was	a	Soviet	incentive	to	pursue	these	questions	in	the	first	place,	and	not	a	direct	response	to	Kim’s	pleas	for	assistance.	Furthermore,	these	
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rejections	were	neither	outright,	nor	did	they	explicitly	reject	the	idea	of	an	invasion,	but	were	rather	based	on	disadvantageous	timing.	At	this	point,	the	Soviet	Union	decisively	abandoned	its	policy	of	peaceful	reunification	and	instead	began	to	search	for	an	opportune	moment	to	begin	the	invasion.		
While	both	the	SCA	reports	and	Kim	IL	Sung’s	pleas	both	agreed	on	the	need	to	invest	in	the	North	Korean	military,	the	SCA	also	stressed	that	there	was	a	high	chance	of	a	prolonged	conflict	with	American	involvement.	The	1949	SCA	documents	not	only	reveal	that	the	largest	consideration	for	the	Soviet	Union	regarding	the	invasion	was	American	involvement,	but	also	the	specific	fears	among	the	leadership.	According	to	it,	a	drawn	out	war	could	be	“used	by	the	Americans	for	purposes	of	agitation	against	the	Soviet	Union	and	for	further	inflaming	war	hysteria”	and	“could	turn	the	[Korean]	population	against	the	party	that	started	the	conflict.	96	The	fear	of	a	prolonged	conflict	was	important	to	Stalin	because	not	only	would	it	mean	losing	influence	in	Korea,	but	also	the	damaging	effects	it	would	have	on	Soviet	reputation	in	Asia.		
DEAN	ACHESON	PRESS	CLUB	SPEECH	(1950)	
In	Stalin’s	consideration	of	American	involvement,	perhaps	one	of	the	largest	events	with	potential	to	sway	foreign	policy	in	Korea	was	a	speech	presented	on	January	12,	1950,	by	U.S	Secretary	of	Defense,	Dean	Acheson,	to	the	National	Press	Club.	In	his	speech,	Acheson	outlined	the	United	States	foreign	policy	in	Asia	as	well	as	the	defensive	perimeter	of	the	Pacific,	importantly	leaving	the	Korean	peninsula	
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outside	of	the	protected	zone.	While	the	panicked	reaction	in	the	ROK	to	the	speech	has	been	well	documented,	the	question	of	its	impact	on	Stalin	and	Soviet	foreign	policy	remains	unresolved.97	Since	one	of	Stalin’s	primary	concerns	in	approving	Kim’s	lobbying	for	invasion	was	the	possibility	of	American	intervention,	the	effects	of	the	Acheson	speech	on	Soviet	policy	has	been	given	a	central	role	in	the	narrative.	However,	with	the	archival	materials	available,	it	is	evident	that	the	speech	had	a	negligible	impact	on	decision	making	in	the	invasion	of	South	Korea.	
Historians	such	as	Kim	Hakjoon	have	given	this	speech	a	prominent	role,	advancing	the	opinion	that	this	exclusion	provided	Stalin	with	a	green	light	to	invade	since	it	was	likely	seen	in	Moscow	as	evidence	that	the	United	States	would	not	intervene	in	any	conflict.	98	Hakjoon	goes	further,	arguing	that	when	Stalin	referred	to	the	changed	international	situation	he	“probably	had	in	mind	the	speech	given	…	by	U.S.	Secretary	of	State	Dean	Acheson	three	months	earlier	in	January,	1950."99	Katheryn	Weathersby	similarly	concludes	that	the	timing	of	Stalin’s	approval	was	“at	least	in	part”	a	response	to	the	new	defensive	perimeter.100	Other	historians	however	have	questioned	the	importance	of	the	Acheson	Speech	such	as	James	Matray	and	the	authors	of	Uncertain	Partners	who	argue	that	Acheson’s	
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speech	had	little	if	any	impact	on	Soviet	deliberations.101		As	Robert	Tucker,	a	Soviet	political	history	expert	points	out,	even	though	Indochina	was	excluded	from	the	perimeter	as	well,	it	was	clear	to	the	Soviet	Union	that	U.S	aid	and	growing	involvement	was	underway,	therefore	U.S	responses	to	a	Korean	crisis	could	not	be	anticipated	based	simply	on	Acheson’s	declaration.102	Historians	have	also	pointed	to	the	fact	that	Acheson’s	speech	was	more	nuanced	than	it	is	sometimes	given	credit	for.	As	historian	John	Merrill	explains,	the	speech	“acknowledged	the	importance	of	Asian	nationalism,	warned	of	a	Soviet	attempt	to	pry	loose	Manchuria	from	China,	and	stressed	accurately	that	the	US	would	defend	Korea	under	the	collective	security	arrangements	of	the	United	Nations.”103	While	the	Acheson	speech	did	outline	a	security	perimeter,	the	remainder	of	the	speech	actually	sought	to	build	support	for	U.S.	Policy	in	Korea	while	also	serving	as	a	warning	to	the	Soviet	Union	against	provocative	actions.104	According	to	Acheson	in	his	memoirs,	the	speech	was	intended	to	“carry	some	sense	of	the	problem	in	the	Far	East,	the	limitation	of	our	power	and	direction	of	our	purpose.”105	It	is	unlikely	that	the	Soviet	leadership	focused	only	on	the	security	perimeter	and	entirely	missed	these	nuances.	Furthermore,	the	assertion	that	the	speech	was	primary	in	influencing	
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policy	assumes	an	inexperienced	Stalin	taking	Acheson’s	public	statement	of	private	policy	at	face	value.		
While	only	one	Soviet	document	makes	mention	of	the	speech,	and	there	is	no	direct	reference	in	it	to	Korea,	it	is	illuminating	in	its	revelation	of	Soviet	attitudes	and	reading	of	Acheson’s	declaration.	On	January	17th,	1950,	Mao	visited	Moscow	to	discuss	the	Sino-Soviet	Treaty	of	Friendship	and	Alliance,	and	subsequently	met	with	Soviet	leaders	Molotov	and	Vyshinsky.	During	their	discussions,	Molotov	raised	to	Mao	the	impression	that	Acheson’s	speech	was	“designed	to	deceive	directly	public	opinion.”	Then,	after	having	read	the	text	in	its	entirety,	Mao	responded	that	the	Americans	were	making	progress	as	previously	“these	fabrications	were	the	job	of	all	kinds	of	scoundrels,	represented	by	American	journalists	and	correspondents	…	[and]	the	U.S	Secretary	of	State	was	now	doing	the	dirty	work.”106	Mao	then	asked	if	the	speech	was	potentially	“a	kind	of	smokescreen,	using	which,	the	American	imperialists	will	attempt	to	occupy	the	island	of	Formosa”	to	which	Molotov	agreed,	adding	that	the	United	States	intended	to	use	it	to	carry	out	“plans	of	occupation”	and	“create	misunderstandings	in	the	relations	between	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	People's	Republic	of	China."107	Throughout	their	discussions,	the	communist	leaders	continued	to	frequently	reference	the	deceitful	nature	of	the	speech	and	developed	a	clear	consensus	that	it	should	not	be	taken	at	face	value.	Therefore,	it	is	unlikely	that	in	their	assessments	of	the	situation	on	the	
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Korean	Peninsula	and	the	intentions	of	the	United	States,	the	Soviet	leadership	would	have	heavily	relied	on	the	speech.	
Stalin	was	more	receptive	to	the	idea	of	a	military	reunification	of	the	Korean	Peninsula	following	the	Acheson	speech,	however	there	is	no	evidence	that	it	was	a	direct	result	of	this.	In	fact,	many	months	after	the	speech,	Stalin	remained	cautious	and	in	his	March	1950	meeting	with	Kim,	he	stressed	that	the	matter	of	invasion	still	required	“thorough	preparation”	and	must	be	“organized	in	such	a	way	that	there	will	not	be	a	large	risk.”108	Though	Stalin	accepted	the	idea	of	an	invasion	in	theory,	he	remained	adamant	about	avoiding	a	protracted	conflict,	and	relied	on	information	from	both	the	SCA	and	Kim	IL	Sung	in	his	calculations.		
THE	GOTTWALD	LETTER	(1950)	In	2005,	a	letter	from	Stalin	to	Klement	Gottwald,	leader	of	the	Czechoslovak	Socialist	Republic,	emerged	from	the	Soviet	archives,	adding	a	new	layer	to	the	debate	regarding	Stalin’s	calculations	of	the	potential	United	States	involvement	in	the	Korean	conflict.	The	letter,	dated	August	27,	1950	was	written	a	few	months	after	the	Soviet	Union	boycotted	the	United	Nations	Security	Council	in	response	to	the	defeat	of	their	proposal	to	expel	the	Nationalist	Chinese	representative.109	The	absence	of	the	Soviet	Union	allowed	the	Council	to	vote	in	favor	of	invoking	military	
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action	and	sending	UN	forces	into	Korea.110	Historians	have	endlessly	debated	the	Soviet	Union’s	absence	in	the	meeting,	especially	given	the	fact	that	it	had	veto	power	and	could	have	easily	blocked	the	resolution.111	In	his	letter,	Stalin	outlined	the	reasons	for	the	Soviet	withdrawal,	explaining,			
Following	 our	 withdrawal	 from	 the	 Security	 Council,	 America	 became	entangled	 in	 a	 military	 intervention	 in	 Korea	 and	 is	 now	 squandering	 its	military	prestige	and	moral	authority.	Few	honest	people	can	now	doubt	that	America	is	now	acting	as	an	aggressor	and	tyrant	in	Korea	and	that	it	is	not	as	militarily	powerful	 as	 it	 claims	 to	be.	 In	addition,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	United	States	of	America	is	presently	distracted	from	Europe	in	the	Far	East.	Does	it	not	 give	 us	 an	 advantage	 in	 the	 global	 balance	 of	 power?	 It	 undoubtedly	does.112		The	document	indicated	that	Stalin	not	only	predicted	US	involvement	but	also	actually	intended	to	lure	the	United	States	into	a	prolonged	engagement	in	order	to	divert	their	resources	from	Europe.	If	true,	this	would	confirm	that	the	main	priority	in	Soviet	international	strategy	was	Europe,	rather	than	Asia	and	that	Stalin	was	insincere	in	his	alliance	with	Kim	IL	Sung	and	Mao.	The	letter	would	also	explain	Stalin’s	decision	to	veto	the	UN	Resolution,	rationalizing	that	by	giving	the	American	government	a	free	hand	to	establish	a	majority	vote	in	the	Security	Council,	they	would	allow	it	to	become	embroiled	in	Korea.	Historians	such	as	Donggill	Kim	have	
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taken	this	document	at	face	value	to	advance	the	argument	that	Stalin	was	unconcerned	with	US	involvement	and	firmly	place	the	majority	of	the	responsibility	for	the	conflict	on	Stalin,	while	removing	agency	from	Kim	IL	Sung	almost	entirely.113	
The	overreliance	of	one	archival	document	in	asserting	a	claim	illustrates	the	danger	in	cherry	picking	documents	rather	than	analyzing	the	entire	set,	while	also	revealing	the	broader	difficulty	in	interpreting	Soviet	sources	during	Stalin’s	reign.	When	reading	these	documents,	it	is	crucial	to	carefully	consider	the	Machiavellian	character	of	Stalin	and	the	image	he	wished	to	portray	of	Soviet	leadership	to	his	allies	and	the	international	community.	Historians	like	William	Stueck	dismiss	assertions	such	as	Donggil	Kim’s,	pointing	out	that	the	document	should	be	seen	“less	as	an	accurate	rendering	of	past	calculations	or	of	Stalin's	current	state	of	mind	than	as	an	effort	to	reassure	a	nervous	ally	of	the	ineffable	wisdom	of	Soviet	leadership.”	Stueck	touches	on	the	important	point	that	depending	on	whom	he	was	communicating	with,	Stalin	manipulated	and	twisted	the	image	of	his	leadership,	therefore	helping	to	explain	the	sometimes-contradictory	nature	of	the	primary	documents.		The	Gottwald	letter’s	credibility	is	placed	into	further	question,	as	it	is	not	corroborated	by	any	other	documents	from	the	period.	While	the	letter	presents	Stalin	as	having	a	shrewd	Korean	master	plan,	the	remainder	of	the	materials	clearly	shows	a	cautious	Soviet	policy	that	feared	and	carefully	calculated	the	potential	involvement	of	the	United	States.	Considering	the	fact	that	Stalin	held	off	for	over	a	
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year	on	Kim’s	requests,	specifically	urging	the	need	to	contain	the	scale	of	the	conflict	it	is	clear	that	he	was	waiting	for	an	opportune	moment	to	invade	and	avoid	a	protracted	conflict.	Kim	had	tirelessly	worked	to	convince	Stalin	that	the	conflict	would	be	over	quickly.	Finally,	the	sheer	amount	of	economic	and	military	support	provided	to	North	Korea	illustrates	a	clear	commitment	to	the	region	by	Stalin.	The	most	recent	archival	documents	have	proven	the	full	extent	of	the	military	assistance	provided	by	the	Soviet	Union	showing	the	direct	participation	of	Soviet	pilots	in	the	conflict.114	Assurances	by	Kim	IL	Sung	that	the	conflict	would	be	over	quickly	with	no	foreign	involvement	were	factors	that	Stalin	took	under	serious	consideration,	and	therefore	the	Gottwald	letter	was	simply	retroactive	justification	for	a	conflict	that	became	unintendedly	prolonged.		
BETWEEN	TWO	GIANTS:	KIM’S	POLICY	OF	BALANCING		(1950)	
After	Soviet	troops	withdrew	in	1948,	Kim	had	begun	to	consolidate	power	and	gain	independence	within	the	North	Korean	political	system,	however	he	found	it	harder	to	gain	independence	from	Stalin	and	Mao.	As	Lankov	argues,		“despite	the	noisy	assertion	of	North	Korean	propaganda,	the	dependence	of	…North	Korea	…	on	the	Soviet	Union	and	China	was	never	really	overcome.”115	To	maintain	control	over	his	foreign	policy,	Kim	was	instead	forced	to	influence	Stalin	through	a	tactic	known	as	a	“policy	of	balancing”	between	Moscow	and	Beijing.	Contrary	to	the	orthodox	
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image	of	a	coherent	and	monolithic	communist	partnership,	post-revisionist	scholars	tend	to	recognize	the	early	alliance	between	Stalin	and	Mao	as	problematic	and	uneasy.116	During	the	Chinese	civil	war,	Stalin	was	hesitant	to	provide	the	PLA	with	support	and	played	both	sides	by	maintaining	a	relationship	with	nationalist	leader	Chiang	Kai-shek,	while	Mao	ignored	Stalin’s	advice	on	making	agreements	with	the	Nationalist	Kuomintang.117	As	Korean	historian	Hyung-Kook	Kim	points	out	“Mao	had	come	to	power	in	China	not	because	of	Stalin	but,	in	many	ways,	in	spite	of	Stalin.”118	In	fact,	after	the	PLA	victory,	Stalin	had	failed	to	congratulate	Mao	and	did	not	immediately	recognize	the	PRC.119	Though	the	Treaty	of	Friendship	in	1950	signaled	a	rapprochement	in	their	relationship,	Stalin	still	found	it	difficult	to	embrace	Mao	and	the	treaty	was	primarily	a	pragmatic	measure	to	address	security	concerns	in	Asia.120	By	exploiting	these	major	rifts	between	the	USSR	and	China,	Kim	was	able	to	gain	aid	and	support	for	the	invasion	of	South	Korea	from	Stalin	under	his	own	terms	while	at	the	same	time,	reducing	the	influence	of	the	USSR	and	China	in	the	region.	Both	Stalin	and	Mao	were	aware	that	if	one	of	the	allies	faltered,	Kim	could	simply	turn	to	the	other.121		
While	Kim’s	policy	of	balancing	is	briefly	acknowledged	in	some	of	the	literature	on	North	Korean	foreign	relations,	it	has	not	received	adequate	attention	
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in	the	historiography	of	the	Korean	War.	This	is	partly	due	to	the	fact	that	Kim’s	policy	only	became	prominent	and	refined	during	the	Sino-Soviet	Split	in	the	late	50’s	and	60’s,	and	was	only	first	acknowledged	in	reports	from	communist	embassies	in	North	Korea	in	the	late	1970’s.122	However,	archival	evidence	shows	that	the	policy	had	its	origins	much	earlier,	in	the	lead	up	to	the	Korean	War.	Between	1945	and	1948	North	Korea	relied	heavily	on	support	from	the	Soviet	Union	and	was	highly	dependent	on	it	both	economically	and	politically.	While	it	had	closer	cultural	and	historic	ties	to	China,	the	Chinese	People's	Liberation	Army	(PLA)	were	embroiled	in	a	civil	war	and	the	Communist	Party	of	China	was	not	in	a	position	to	provide	significant	support	to	North	Korea.	Bruce	Cummings	proposes	that	the	PLA’s	victory	in	September	1949	and	the	establishment	of	the	Peoples	Republic	of	China	had	an	enormous	refractory	effect	on	Kim	IL	Sung’s	foreign	policy.123	Not	only	had	it	provided	the	North	Korean	regime	with	an	additional	source	of	aid,	it	had	provided	it	with	a	powerful	ally	that	could	offset	the	Soviet	Union’s	influence	in	the	country.		
Specifically,	Kim	exploited	the	growing	competition	between	China	and	the	USSR	in	his	interactions	with	Stalin	to	obtain	aid	for	an	invasion	of	South	Korea.	Though	documents	regarding	meetings	between	Kim	and	Mao	have	yet	to	be	released,	it	is	clear	from	Soviet	sources	that	at	least	in	1950,	Kim	was	leaning	towards	the	Soviet	Union.	A	ciphered	telegram	from	Soviet	representative	Aleksei	
																																								 																				
122	“Note	On	a	Meeting	in	the	Embassy	of	Czechoslovakia	on	5	September	1973,”	September	13,	1973,	History	and	Public	Policy	Program	Digital	Archive,	PolA	AA,	MfAA,	C	295/78.	Obtained	and	translated	for	NKIDP	by	Bernd	Schaefer.	
123	Origins,	1990,	pp.	369-71	
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Ignatieff	in	Pyongyang	sent	to	Vyshinsky	for	example	indicates	that	Mao	wasn’t	even	aware	Kim	was	meeting	with	Stalin.124	This	document	suggests	that	Kim	had	purposely	kept	China	in	the	dark,	partly	in	order	to	play	up	to	Stalin,	but	also	later	to	entice	Mao	to	play	a	larger	role	on	the	peninsula.		
Another	document	of	significance	is	a	telegram	from	Shtykov	to	the	Soviet	Foreign	Minister	regarding	a	drunken	luncheon	at	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	the	DPRK	on	January	17,	1950.	During	the	luncheon,	Shtykov	reported	that	Kim	“repeatedly	underscored	the	great	interest	of	the	Soviet	people	in	Korea	and	the	numerous	wishes	for	quick	unification	of	the	country”	but	expressed	disappointment	that	Stalin	did	not	deem	it	necessary	to	attack	the	South.	Kim	had	also	made	sure	to	stress	the	point	that	if	the	Soviet	Union	was	unwilling	to	help,		“Mao	Zedong	is	his	friend	and	will	always	help	Korea.”125	Shtykov	correctly	interpreted	Kim’s	behavior	as	probing	the	Soviet	Union’s	outlook	stating,	“[i]t	was	obvious	that	he	began	this	conversation	not	accidentally,	but	had	thought	it	out	earlier,	with	the	goal	of	laying	out	his	frame	of	mind	and	elucidating	our	attitude	to	these	questions.”126	The	main	purpose	of	the	luncheon	for	Kim	was	to	pressure	Stalin	to	unilaterally	accept	his	plans	for	reunification	while	also	highlighting	the	fact	that	if	Stalin	faltered,	Mao	would	satisfy	his	requests.		
																																								 																				124	“Ciphered	telegram,	Soviet	Representative	Aleksei	Ignatieff	in	Pyongyang	to	Vyshinsky,”	April	10,	1950,	History	and	Public	Policy	Program	Digital	Archive,	APRF,	Listy	148-149,	Fond	and	Opis	not	given;	and	AVPRF,	Fond	059a,	Opis	5a,	Delo	3,	Papka	11,	Listy	98-99	
125	“Telegram	Shtykov	to	Vyshinsky	on	a	Luncheon	at	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	the	DPRK,”	January	19,	1950,	History	and	Public	Policy	Program	Digital	Archive,	AVP	RF,	Fond	059a,	Opis	5a,	Delo	3,	Papka	11,	listy	87-91.	126	“Telegram	Shtykov	to	Vyshinsky	on	a	Luncheon	at	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	the	DPRK,”	January	19,	1950	
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In	another	telegram,	dated	May	12,	1950	Shtykov	recalls	the	details	of	a	meeting	he	had	with	Kim	IL	Sung	to	Vyshinski.	In	this	meeting,	Kim	IL	Sung	detailed	to	Shtykov	a	meeting	that	would	take	place	the	following	day	between	himself	and	Mao,	and	outlined	the	questions	they	would	discuss	which	included	informing	China	on	the	military	invasion	as	well	as	requests	for	aid.	Again,	Kim	probed	Shtykov	on	the	disposition	of	Soviet	feelings	towards	this	meeting	asking		“what	kind	of	questions	he	should	raise	before	Mao	Zedong	from	the	point	of	view	of	assistance	in	the	intended	operation.”	After	declining	to	answer,	Kim	then	outlined	that	he	intended	to	ask	for	ammunition	and	other	aid	from	China.	However	after	discussing	further	with	Shtykov,	Kim	decided	not	to	pursue	any	requests	for	Mao	about	assistance	“since	all	his	requests	were	satisfied	by	Moscow	and	the	necessary	and	sufficient	assistance	was	given	to	him	there.”127	Again	Kim	had	made	it	apparent	to	Stalin	that	while	he	was	thankful	for	Soviet	support,	he	would	need	to	continue	to	satisfy	his	requests	or	otherwise	risk	losing	an	ally	to	China.	Kim	had	clearly	understood	that	he	could	bolster	his	military	and	economic	requests	by	playing	off	of	Stalin	and	Mao’s	competition	for	the	mantle	of	leader	of	international	communism.	
In	total,	Kim	sent	over	48	telegrams	to	Stalin	requesting	approval	for	an	invasion.	Although	Stalin	did	not	approve	these	plans,	he	nevertheless	provided	Kim	IL	Sung	with	his	economic	and	military	requests,	supporting	the	buildup	and	
																																								 																				127	“Telegram	Shtykov	to	Vyshinsky	on	a	Luncheon	at	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	the	DPRK,”	January	19,	1950,	History	and	Public	Policy	Program	Digital	Archive,	AVP	RF,	Fond	059a,	Opis	5a,	Delo	3,	Papka	11,	listy	87-91.	
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training	of	the	North	Korean	Army.128	Although	Stalin	undoubtedly	saw	an	opportunity	to	extend	communist	power	in	the	Korean	peninsula,	it	is	clear	that	he	was	also	willing	to	maintain	the	status	quo.	Kim	however	exploited	the	fact	that	Stalin	relied	on	him	for	information	on	the	peninsula,	as	well	as	Stalin’s	wish	to	keep	Mao	in	a	supplicant’s	position.	Kim	furthermore	echoed	the	SCA’s	reports	which	fueled	Stalin’s	growing	fears	of	a	southern	led	invasion.	In	April	1950,	following	the	secret	meeting	between	Kim	and	Stalin	in	Moscow,	Kim	was	sent	to	China	to	secure	Mao’s	approval	for	the	planned	invasion	which	began	on	June	25,	1950.		The	conflict’s	final	approval	and	planning	were	made	by	the	Soviet	Union,	and	although	the	conflict	could	not	have	been	achieved	without	Stalin’s	assent,	Kim	Il	Sung	and	the	SCA	played	a	fundamental	role	in	convincing	him	of	its	necessity.	The	conflict	was	therefore	neither	“Kim	IL	Sung’s	war”	as	some	have	argued,	not	was	it	a	grand	master	plan	created	by	Stalin.129		
CONCLUSION	AND	PARALLELS	With	the	constant	stream	of	new	archival	evidence,	the	post-revisionist	school	has	firmly	shown	the	extent	of	the	Soviet	Union’s	involvement	in	the	Korean	War;	however,	it	often	gives	Stalin	and	the	USSR	too	much	responsibility	for	the	conflict.	This	paper	has	endeavored	to	add	nuance	to	the	understudied	and	often	times	misunderstood	relationship	between	Josef	Stalin	and	Kim	IL	Sung,	and	illuminate	the	decisions	that	led	to	an	invasion	of	South	Korea	on	June	25,	1950.	The	
																																								 																				128	Weathersby,	Kathryn.	“	The	Soviet	Role	in	the	Early	Phase	of	the	Korean	War:	New	Documentary	Evidence”	The	Journal	of	American-East	Asian	Relations,	Vol.	2,	No.	4	(Winter	1993),	428	
129	Robert	C.	Tucker	"The	Cold	War	in	Stalin’s	Time:	What	the	New	Sources	Reveal."	
Diplomatic	History	12,	no.	2	(December	17,	2002):	276.	
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fact	that	Kim	had	understood	and	exploited	the	rift	between	the	USSR	and	China	shows	that	he	was	not	simply	a	pawn	in	the	Cold	War,	nor	was	the	Korean	War	an	international	proxy	war.	While	archival	records	clearly	demonstrate	that	the	Soviet	Union	pursued	its	own	interests	and	significantly	contributed	to	nation	building	in	North	Korea	and	the	Korean	War,	Stalin	never	had	any	grand	plans	in	the	peninsula.	He	was	cautious	in	his	approach,	and	his	primary	ambition	was	to	secure	a	communist	controlled	North	while	avoiding	a	prolonged	military	conflict.		
Near	the	end	of	his	life,	Stalin	became	increasingly	aware	of	the	Soviet	Union’s	failures	in	Europe	and	began	to	heavily	invest	in	Asian	communist	movements.	However,	after	the	communist	victory	in	China,	Stalin	began	an	uneasy	and	competitive	relationship	with	Mao	for	the	mantle	of	the	communist	world	movement.	This	competition	was	utilized	by	Kim	IL	Sung	to	obtain	significant	military	and	economic	aid	in	North	Korea.		Stalin	was	content	with	supporting	Kim	and	nation	building	in	North	Korea,	as	long	as	peaceful	coexistence	remained	on	the	peninsula.	Stalin	feared	that	any	provocative	actions	against	the	south	might	result	in	a	prolonged	conflict	with	American	intervention,	which	would	damage	the	Soviet	reputation	abroad,	and	consequently	jeopardize	his	role	as	the	leader	of	the	communist	movement.	While	Stalin	refused	Kim’s	requests	for	invasion	throughout	1948	and	1949	however,	he	agreed	with	them	in	principle	and	his	rejections	were	conditional	based	on	disadvantageous	timing.	Contrary	to	many	arguments	therefore,	his	eventual	approval	was	neither	reluctant	nor	surprising.	By	1949,	Stalin	had	begun	to	accept	the	inevitability	of	an	attack	due	to	both	Kim	and	Shtykov’s	assessments	of	the	situation	on	the	peninsula.	He	remained	cautious	
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however	and	decided	to	strike	after	receiving	explicit	Chinese	support,	along	with	a	multitude	of	other	factors	such	as	the	Soviet’s	acquisition	of	the	nuclear	bomb.	Stalin	was	ultimately	the	key	decision	maker	in	the	invasion,	however	he	neither	had	a	grand	plan,	nor	was	Kim	IL	Sung	simply	his	puppet.	In	fact,	for	the	majority	of	North	Korea’s	buildup,	Soviet	policy	was	ill	informed	and	largely	ad-hoc.		
After	the	culmination	of	the	Korean	War,	USSR-DPRK	relations	quickly	weakened	and	by	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union,	they	crumbled	as	Russian	leaders	prioritized	strengthening	ties	with	South	Korea	and	significantly	cut	aid	to	North	Korea.	However,	as	Putin	begins	to	reassert	Russian	influence	and	foreign	policy	interests	around	the	world,	he	has	also	brought	about	a	tentative	political	and	economic	rapprochement	with	the	DPRK.	As	Russia	reasserts	its	influence	in	the	region,	while	China	and	the	United	States	are	mired	in	regional	negotiations,	Armstrong	notes	that	the	current	conflict	in	Korea	is	not	a	new	crisis	but	rather	one	that	has	taken	on	a	new	form.130	It	is	prudent	therefore	to	recall	the	lessons	from	the	origins	of	the	Korea	War	and	avoid	assuming	North	Korea	is	merely	a	puppet	regime	that	is	easily	manipulated.		In	negotiations	for	reunification	and	peace,	it	is	important	to	recognize	that	North	Korea	is	still	an	independent	actor	that	continues	to	exploit	loopholes	in	the	international	framework.		As	numerous	scholars	note,	the	mercurial	power	balancing	originated	by	Kim	Il	Sung	is	still	a	prominent	feature	in	North	Korean	policy	today,	as	Kim	Jong	Un	balances	the	interests	of	the	United	
																																								 																				130	Armstrong,	Charles.	“The	Nature	of	the	North	Korean	Threat”	Presentation	at	the	Canadian	International	Council	North	Korean	Nuclear	Challenge	Summit,	Toronto,	ON,	February	26,	2018.		
	55	
	
States	and	China,	and	to	a	lesser	extent	Russia,	as	they	compete	for	influence	over	the	peninsula.131	
Though	Russia	is	seeking	both	its	own	economic	and	political	interests	in	the	region,	which	includes	boosting	development	in	the	Russian	Far	East,	it	is	also	interested	in	security	along	its	borders	and	regional	stability.	It	therefore	has	potential	to	become	a	faithful	mediator	between	the	North	and	South.	Elena	Ponomareva	and	Georgij	Rudov	note	that	the	DPRK	might	be	perceptive	to	Russia’s	mediation	as	it	is	“interested	in	exiting	the	‘Chinese	umbrella’”	and	looking	to	Russia	as	an	additional	base	of	support	and	as	a	mediator	between	Washington,	Beijing	and	Seoul.	132	Russia’s	role	therefore	should	not	be	underestimated,	especially	at	the	present	time	when	recent	developments	on	the	peninsula	have	borne	historic	summits	between	the	North	and	South,	aimed	at	finally	establishing	peace	and	ending	a	conflict	that	has	been	ongoing	since	1945.						
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132	Elena	Ponomareva	and	Georgij	Rudov,	"Russia–North	Korea:	State	of	Affairs	and	Trends,"	Journal	of	Asian	Public	Policy	9,	no.	1	(2015):	53	
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